Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
3
Key words: New Labour participation  democratisation  citizenship
© The Policy Press, 2000 ISSN 0305 5736
Active citizens and the therapeutic state: the role of
democratic participation in local government reform
David Chandler
English
The Local Government Bill and the White and Green Papers informing it claim to deliver an agenda
of democratic renewal. The reforms promise to reconnect local councils with local communities
through a process of political renewal, a new statutory duty of community-wide consultation and the
encouragement of active citizenship. This article assesses whether the plans for increased popular
engagement in consultation processes actually develop democratic accountability, and suggests that,
although the current proposals may institutionalise new links between government and community
groups and individuals, they will provide little local control over policy making.
Français
Le projet de loi du Gouvernement Local, et les différents livres Blancs édités à ce sujet, prétend
délivrer un programme de renouveau démocratique. La forme promet de tablir la communication
entre les conseils municipaux et les communautés locales par le moyen dun processus de
renouvellement politique, un nouveau devoir défini par la loi pour une consultation communautaire
générale et l’encouragement à une citoyenne active. Cet article évalue si les projets pour un
engagement populaire croissant dans les processus de consultation veloppent ellement une
responsabilité démocratique, et il suggère que malgré le fait que les propositions actuelles puissent
institutionnaliser de nouveaux liens entre le gouvernement, les groupes de la communauté et les
particuliers, elles donneront très peu de contle local sur la prise de mesures politiques.
Español
El Proyecto de Ley del Gobierno Local y los documentos White y Green que los informa, pretende
lanzar una agenda de renovación democtica. Las reformas prometen reconectar ayuntamientos
locales con comunidades locales a través de un proceso de renovación política, un nuevo deber
estatutario de amplia consulta comunitaria y la situación de una ciudadanía activa. Este arculo
examina los planes para el aumento de la participacn popular en los procesos de consulta, para ver
si realmente desarrollan responsabilidad democtica. El arculo, también sugiere que aunque las
actuales propuestas pueden institucionalizar nuevos vínculos entre el gobierno, los grupos comunitarios
y los individuos, proporcionarán poco control sobre las decisiones políticas.
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1: 3–14
Final submission 25 May 2000 Acceptance 29 June 2000
4
Introduction
The New Labour local government reform agen-
da sets out a radical vision of democratic renewal,
‘bringing government back to the people’ through
giving a greater say to local communities and
greater freedoms to local councils. Modernised
local authorities have been promised new pow-
ers which will better reflect their policy-making
freedoms, greater accountability and enhanced
local leadership role. Within local authorities,
elected councillors will have greater freedom
and a greater impact on the direction of the coun-
cil and the services it provides” (DETR, 1998b:
para 3.13). The new ‘open and in-touch coun-
cils’ will be able to empower local communities
radically, giving thema real choice about how
they are governed locally [which] will give
local communities real influence and power
(DETR, 1998b: Foreword; para 2.9).
For some commentators, the democratisation
proposals are seen as merely the latest in a long
line of local government reforms, with many
observers being cynical in the face of the prom-
ise of chan ge (Boy ne , 1999 ; Leach and
Wingfield, 1999; Tam, 1999). Others have wel-
comed these reforms as a positive move away
from passive notions of consumer choice, epito-
mised by Citizen Charter initiatives under
Conservative rule, holding out the promise of
increasing popular accountability in decision
making (Elcock, 1998; West, 2000). This article
analyses the reform proposals claims to enhance
local democracy and empowerment through a
consideration of the momentum behind local au-
thority reform. Reform is placed within the
broader context of central government attempts
to address problems of social cohesion by re-
building institutional linkages and, in the process,
recasting the relationship between the state and
society through the development of active
citizenship’.
A new role for local government
The Department for the Environment, Transport
and the Regions (DETR) and central government
launched the local government reform propos-
als as part of the rebirth of democratic local
government” a project seen as “vital to building
a modern Britain and a decent society” (DETR,
1998a: Preface). The government’s local democ-
racy agenda highlights the need for a “radical
refocusing of councils” traditional roles’ and for
a “fundamental shift of culture throughout local
government” (DETR, 1998d: Foreword). The
implications of opening up local government to
popular involvement will include not only the
restructuring of local government, but also a ‘rad-
ical change’ in local councils’ relationships with
their communities and with central government
itself (DETR, 1998a: para 1.7).
This fundamental modernisation of local gov-
ernment is believed to be a necessity to tackle
the problems of social disengagement with com-
munity affairs, the culture of apathy’ and low
turnout at local polls. Support for government
initiatives at a local level is seen as more impor-
tant than ever before, the government even
declaring that reinvigorated local government is
vital if it is to deliver its manifesto pledges on
the ground where it matters (DETR, 1998a: para
1.6). Today, organised party politics have little
purchase on the rest of society; in fact there is
large-scale alienation from, or at minimum an
indifference to, political institutions (Giddens,
1994: 109; Beck, 1998: 4). As leading New La-
bour theoretician Anthony Giddens concludes:
“Political ideas today seem to have lost their ca-
pacity to inspire and political leaders their ability
to lead” (1998: 2). With the government at West-
minster increasingly seen as distant from people’s
lives, New Labour’s local government reforms
seek to restore the links between the state and
society, by “bringing government to the people”:
The basic fact is that we all live somewhere
and we all have local loyalties [this]
makes local democracy the best system
It draws strength, purpose and dynamism
from local need, local loyalty, local expe-
rience and local knowledge. (Labour Party,
1995: 3)
The government’s need to get ‘in touch’ is not
merely a reflection of the decline of national
politics and the lack of popular involvement with
political parties. The problem of articulating a
national ‘vision’ also reflects the fragmentation
of other collective, associational links between
the state and society, from the falling member-
ship and influence of trade unions and working
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
5
men’s associations to the decline of the estab-
lished church and the Women’s Institute. The
political repercussions of the collapse of these
collective institutions were raised in the 1980s
by communitarian theorists who warned that
“markets and contracts ... do not create any so-
cial cohesion in and of themselves. They require
and use up the active identification of citizens
with their communities as ‘social mortar’” (Beck,
1998: 13). The policy advocates of the Third Way
share the communitariansfocus on rebuilding
social cohesion, advocating a proactive and in-
terventionist set of policies on behalf of both the
central and local state. Today, the intervention-
ist project of recreating ‘social solidarity’ through
recasting the relationship between the state and
society is often termed democratisation (Held,
1993; Giddens, 1994, 1998). For leading Ger-
man social theorist Ulrich Beck:
The answer is: only by upgrading the lo-
cal area of democracy, the towns and cities
... All of this presumes, among other
things, a repoliticization of municipal pol-
icy, indeed a rediscovery and redefinition
of it by mobilizing programmes, ideas and
people... (1998: 16)
The local state is cast in a new, much more so-
cially engaged, position in this perspective,
playing a crucial role in government attempts to
create new points of contact and links with a more
individualised society. Prior to the White Paper
on local government reforms the desire to insti-
tutionalise local authority involvement in
community-level initiatives was already clear.
The Health White Paper and proposals for Health
Action Zones placed requirements on local au-
thorities to promote local involvement. Similarly,
the Crime and Disorder Bill required local coun-
cils to obtain the views of the public about the
level and pattern of crime and argued for wide-
spread consultation about strategies for reducing
crime and disorder (DETR, 1998e: para 1.3). The
Local Government Bill extends this process fur-
ther, with the government instructing local
authorities to play a leading and coordinating role
in bringing different agencies together. The new
reform proposals call for “consultation and par-
ticipation [to be] embedded into the culture of
all councils (DETR, 1998d: para 4.6). This
change in culture extends local government in-
volvement with community participation projects
being developed by other private and public bod-
ies (Martin, 1998: 5).
In order to fulfil this cohering role the gov-
ernm ent requires councils to de ve lop a
comprehensive strategy for promoting the well-
being of their area”. There will be a new statutory
force behind this interventionist vision in the
“duty to promote the economic, social and envi-
ronmental well-being of their areas (DETR,
1998d: para 8.8). This strategy is to involve in-
stitutionalising partnerships with a wide range
of agencies and organisations (DETR, 1998d:
para 8.21):
local people, individually and collectively
through community groups, local women’s
organisations and residents associations;
local business community;
voluntary groups;
private organisations;
public bodies (eg executive agencies of gov-
ernment, the new Regional Development
Agencies, Training and Enterprise Councils
and National Health Service bodies).
Local councils are to play an ‘enabling’ role,
shaping policy through the development of ‘stra-
tegic partnerships in different policy areas, with
powers to address a much broader variety of con-
cerns, issues as va riable as sustaina ble
development, social exclusion, transport, health,
crime, education and training (DETR, 1998d:
para 8.5). This enabling role, facilitating the in-
volvement of different public, private and
voluntary organisations, all with distinct remits
and responsibilities, may facilitate policy coor-
dination, although the gains for local democracy
are less obvious, as the networked agencies will
maintain their own lines of accountability (Duffy
and Hutchinson, 1997; Tam, 1999: 29). The new
interventionist role of local government does not
stop with networking existing groups. A DETR
guidance paper concentrates solely on public
participation that is deliberately stimulated by
local authorities (DETR, 1998e: Introduction).
The DETR aims are ambitiously laid out: “We
want to see any culture of indifference about lo-
cal democracy dispersed, and local people taking
a lively interest in their council and its affairs
6
(DETR, 1998d: para 1.21). A key problem is that
only a small percentage of the population is in-
volved in collective groups even at a local level.
A further stage in this process is the attempt to
involve the uninvolved, to create and promote
the model of the ‘active citizen’:
In a society where tradition and custom
are losing their hold, the only route to the
establishing of authority is via democra-
cy. The new ind ividualism doesnt
inevitably corrode authority, but demands
it be recast on an active and participatory
basis. (Giddens, 1998: 66)
Local government democratisation aims to cre-
ate new institutional forms linking the state to a
much more atomised and fragmented society,
providing new mechanisms of social cohesion.
Giddens, for example, considers ways of reinte-
grating society through “forms of democracy
other than the orthodox voting process” in order
for governments to “re-establish more direct con-
tact with citizens through ‘experiments with
democracy’ local direct democracy, electronic
referenda, citizen’s juries and other possibilities”
(1998: 75). Local authorities had already made
major strides to increase involvement and con-
sultation prior to the current reform proposals.
In 1997, 85% had undertaken public meetings
or issued consultative documents, and virtually
all councils had schemes providing feedback
from service users (DETR, 1998d: para 1.1).
Most local authorities had already taken up more
innovative proposals for participation: around
50% had focus groups; approximately a quarter
had visioning exercises, some user management
of services and interactive websites; and around
one in five already had citizenspanels or were
experimenting with citizens juries (DETR,
1998e: para 1.1).
For the DETR this, already extensive, use of
innovative approaches to community involve-
ment was still not adequate, and the consultation
documents stress the need to develop deeper
ways of involving communities” (DETR, 1998e:
para 1.2). The DETR’s Guidance on enhancing
public participation in local government urges
local authorities to “go out to the public” and
work at “extending invitations to non-joiners
through building community capacity. This
interactive approach is to include citizenship ed-
ucation, community development and targeted
initiatives aimed at young people or other groups
who are difficult to involve (DETR, 1998e: para
3.2).
As the DETR states: Local government mat-
ters(DETR, 1998a: para 1.1). However, it does
not matter in the way it did in the past: “There is
no future in the old models of councils trying to
plan and run most services” (DETR, 1998d: Fore-
word). Local councils are no longer centrally
responsible for raising revenue and for the di-
rect provision of services. Local authorities have
languished for the past two decades, increasing-
ly marginalised politically and reduced to
administrating central government budgets
(Jameson, 2000). Since 1979, over 200 Acts of
Parliament have taken powers away from local
authority control, while the locally raised share
of council spending has fallen from 50% to less
than 20% (Labour Party, 1995: 7, 15). David
Beetham and other commentators have, in fact,
urged central government to enhance local au-
thority autonomy as a p recondition for
democratic renewal (Beetham 1996; Gray and
Jenkins, 1999: 38).
Local authorities matter today, but not because
the government has decided to overhaul the fund-
ing relationships that force local councils to rely
on central government spending priorities and
accede to a wide range of central targets set by
statutory regulation. In fact, central government’s
administrative regulatory control over local au-
thorities is set to be enhanced through the current
batch of reforms. Local authorities matter be-
cause, with the collapse of mediating
associational links between the state and socie-
ty, they are seen as vital in establishing new
points of contact and coherence. The fragment-
ed nature of modern society means that, to fill
this vacuum or facilitate ‘joined-up government’,
links have to be constituted on a local level by
proactive local state bodies. In effect, these re-
forms attempt to revitalise the shaky relationship
between the citizen and the state through the ren-
ovation of local political institutions (Gray and
Jenkins, 1999: 33). As Gerry Stoker notes, local
authorities are well placed to play this new role
because of their institutional permanence,
providing “a solid frame for developing the long-
term commitment associated with networked,
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
7
integrated action (1996: 205). The proposed
changes to local government are intended to turn
local authorities into a mechanism for social co-
hesion, to help councils to engage with their
local communities more effectively (DETR,
1998d: para 4.1):
The Government has a clear vision of suc-
cessfully modernised local government. It
will be characterised by councils which
once again engage directly with their lo-
cal communit ies. Such councils will
actively promote public participation.
(DETR, 1998a: para 1.8)
More participation, less
democracy
The Local Government Bill develops a new set
of structures at local authority level and a new
set of institutional links between central and lo-
cal government and between local government
and the wider community. The local government
reforms are being promoted as empowering for
both local communities and local councils. The
government makes much of letting local people
decide the new arrangements:
Asking people how they want their com-
munity governed is not enough. It is right
for local people themselves to take the
decisions about new forms of local gov-
ernance which involve such radical change
as introducing new elections. (DETR,
1998b: para 2.9)
Councils can choose between three models: hav-
ing a directly elected mayor with a cabinet; a
cabinet with a leader; or a directly elected may-
or with a coun cil manager. Resistance to
modernisation, under these choices, is seen as
merely endorsing the urgency of the proposed
reforms. Reluctance to take up the reform pro-
gramme is seen by the DETR as reflecting a
‘paternalistic culture’, demonstrating a concern
with ‘protecting vested interests’, or, yet worse,
as indicating the existence of an inward look-
ing culture [that] can open the door to corruption
and wrongdoing” (DETR, 1998d: Ch 1). The
preferred choice of the government is for one of
the options involving a directly elected mayor.
A local authority can call a referendum for an
elected mayor, the government can order one it-
self or 5% of the electorate can petition for a
referendum. These proposals mean that the lo-
cal electorate will be involved in deciding on the
form of local government that they are to have.
However, there is to be no local say, by the elect-
ed councils or directly by the electorate, on the
abolition of the existing local authority system.
If the electorate rejects the proposal for an elect-
ed mayor, the government expects local
authorities to adopt another of the proposals
(DETR, 1998b: para 2.16).
The choice between these three models is de-
scribed by the DETR as opening up a much
richer variety of local democratic structures
(DETR, 1998d: para 3.28). However, this rich
variety’ is to be strictly regulated under the Lo-
cal Government Bill and statutory instruments
which will specify the ‘key broad parameters’ of
any new constitution, including the requirements
of political and officer positions and their roles
and relationships (DETR, 1998b: para 3.6). In
order for local democracy to be safeguarded, lo-
cal councils freedom to decide their own
timetable for change will be limited by the gov-
ernment’s proposal for “reserve power to tackle
cases of abuse or inertia”:
Where a council has developed proposals
with a timetable but is failing to act upon
them, or has neglected to develop any pro-
posals at all, the Government will have the
power to require the council to hold a ref-
erendum asking the local electorate to
support one of the approved models.
(DETR, 1998d: para 3.33)
Even where the council itself decides to hold a
referendum the government will have the power
to lay down the detailed proposal for a new form
of local governance, the form of wording, the
time of the referendum and other procedural
matters (DETR, 1998b: para 2.13).
The new structures being imposed at local
government level effectively split local govern-
ment in two, institutionalising a sharp distinction
between the executive and representative roles.
As the DETR states: These benefits are the
greater, the more the representative role and the
executive role are separated (DETR, 1998a:
8
para 5.14). Under each model there is a strong
executive, responsible for policy preparation and
implementation. The executive would number as
few as three, under the council manager form,
and a maximum of ten councillors or 15% of the
council under the other forms. The executive,
which will not have to reflect the political bal-
ance of the authority, will receive greatly
enhanced powers, with a directly elected mayor
able to veto a council decision and overrule the
council in order to impose a balanced budget.
One area where there will be no choice is the
abolition of the old committee system. The gov-
ernm ent reform proposals claim that the
committee system ‘weakens local accountabili-
ty’ by not providing effective leadership; this
being one factor discouraging people from vot-
ing, as it was not clear who within the council
was making the decisions (DETR, 1998b: paras
1.10, 1.19). The committee system was also held
to be undemocratic because the important deci-
sions were often made by political groups
‘meeting behind closed doors’ (DETR, 1998a:
para. 5.4). This system meant that councillors
wasted too much time in meetings where they
had little influence, the amount of time spent also
being a major deterrent to those with family and
work commitments (DETR, 1998a: para 5.27).
Instead, the committee system will be replaced
by one or more overview or scrutiny commit-
tees, overseeing the work of the executive. This
will cut back the time the majority of council-
lors spend in council meetings, and clarify policy
responsibilities, with the executive councillors
having responsibility for decision making and
defending council policy to the public, while the
backbench councillors have the lead responsi-
bility for scrutiny as informed representatives of
the people. The new scrutiny committees will:
…review decisions taken by the executive
and how it is implementing council policy,
and make reports and recommendations,
including proposals for changes to poli-
cies or practices, to the executive or
council as appropriate. (DETR, 1998b:
para 3.19)
While the executive councillors spend time in
stuffy policy-making meetings, the ‘backbench-
ers will be attending residents meetings and
holding more local surgeries. The majority of
local councillors, freed from their role in policy
making, have an ‘enhanced role’, their efforts
refocused “on becoming the engine for public
participation in decision-making (DETR,
1998b: Postscript). The DETR believes these
councillors “will be accountable, strong, local
representatives for their area:
They will bring their constituents views,
concerns and grievances to the council
through their council’s structures. Their
role will be to represent the people to the
council rather than to defend the council
to the people ... Each councillor will be-
come a champion of their community
defending the public interest in the coun-
cil and channelling the grievances, needs
and aspirations of their electorate into the
scrutiny process. In-touch local council-
lors, aware of and responsive to the needs
of those they represent, will have a great-
er say in the formulation of policy and the
solving of local problems than they could
have within current committee structures.
(DETR, 1998d: paras 3.42, 3.43)
While it is a positive step to encourage council-
lors to be more aware of their constituents needs
their representative capacity is at the same time
being diminished. Perversely, it is the in-touch’
councillors that will have much less say in poli-
cy formulation (Rao, 1999: 267). In fact, calling
the non-executive councillors ‘backbenchers’ is
clearly misleading as it invites unwarranted com-
parisons with the parliamentary division of
members’ roles (Brooks, 1999: 50). In the House
of Commons, backbenchers are involved in de-
cision making and have to ratify proposed
legislation by majority vote; they do not merely
scrutinise policy that has already been agreed. It
would be considered highly undemocratic for the
government to try to “break the attendance cul-
ture of MPs, yet, in the cause of local
accountability’, this is precisely the declared
policy for local authority council members
(DETR, 1998d: para 3.56).
The co mm unity champions will be
responsible for organising and getting involved
with local community consultation schemes.
Area Based Neighbourhood Committees and
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
9
Community Forums as well as Interest and User
Group Forums will be encouraged to form part
of, or feed in to, the scrutiny structure and will
help inform a number of consultation initiatives.
Greater community involvement and policy-
making openness potentially marks a positive
improvement on the closed world of pre-meet-
ing party caucuses of the past. However, there is
a fundamental difference between the, at least
formal, political accountability of the old com-
mittee system, where councillors voted on policy,
and the new regimes of scrutiny and consulta-
tion which involve no final accountability over
policy-making power. Councillors involved in
scrutiny may have the right to interview execu-
tive officers and commission reports, but can
only make recommendations for the executive
to consider. The change in status of the majority
of local councillors is statutorily enforced by the
government requirement that overview or scru-
tiny committees will not be able to take decisions
or exercise responsibilities on behalf of the coun-
cil (DETR, 1998 b: para 3.18). The more
‘in-touch’ backbench councillors may be the peo-
ple’s representatives but apparently can only
represent the people by being freed from the
onerous task of policy making and political ac-
countability that goes with it.
Central government, in fact, looks set to ac-
quire greater regulatory control over local
authorities, through the process of ‘empowering
communities’. This apparent contradiction is
starkly highlighted in the new statutory duty on
councils to consult and engage with their local
communities over producing a community plan
and the provisions of Best Value (DETR, 1998e:
para 1.3). This is portrayed as a transfer of deci-
sion-making power away from the centre, yet,
under the statutory duty of consultation and new
policy frameworks, this will further undermine
local authority autonomy through creating a
whole host of new centrally regulated monitor-
ing regimes.
Best Value, replacing Compulsory Competi-
tive Tendering, is a top-down managerial
imposition with a rolling programme of reviews
comparing service delivery between local author-
ities. Under the new monitoring programme of
the Audit Commission, Local Government Au-
thority, Improvement and Development Agency
and the DETR, central government regulation
will be an ongoing process, emphasising contin-
uous improvement towards national targets in
quality and cost and efficiency (Sanderson,
1998). The minimum target set by the Best Val-
ue regime is that, within five years, standards
should be consistent with those of the top 25%
of all local authorities at the time the standards
are set.
Opportunities to spend will be tied to results
through the Best Value scheme and the ‘beacon
councils initiative. This new initiative will “take
account of performance in service delivery
against national and local performance targets
and performance indicators, and also “have re-
gard to inspectorate reports and auditors
statements on financial management (DETR,
1998d: para 2.21). Each local authority will have
to set annual targets for quality, efficiency and
cost consistent with these targets. However, giv-
en the disparities in local authority performance
it seems unlikely that many councils will be able
to achieve the targets set, with less well-off coun-
cils being even less likely to benefit from
additional funding. These centrally defined tar-
gets have been criticised as even more likely to
“distort local authority behaviour and undermine
local democratic accountability” (Boyne, 1999:
4). In fact, as several commentators have noted,
diversity and freedom in local government serv-
ice delivery can only be reduced by the DETR
focus on national auditability (Brooks, 1999: 51).
Just as Best Value gives little leeway for local
variation, the content of local authority perform-
ance plans, which summarise council objectives
and communicate them to the public, will equal-
ly be tightly prescribed by the government itself
(Boyne, 1999: 5). While the government central-
ly determines the service delivery targets and
performance plans, it seems clear that the DE-
TR’s concern, that these targets should include a
statutory duty of community consultation, has
less to do with policy content than with promot-
ing local involvement. To meet the consultation
requirements, local authorities will have to con-
vince the new Best Value inspectorate and the
Audit Commission that they have a high level
of support from local people and the business
community” (DETR, 1998d: para 2.21).
Conformity with central government admin-
istrative priorities invo lves m ore tha n
target-setting and monitoring regimes. There will
10
be the creation of new disciplinary bodies which
will be part of the new ethical framework
(DETR, 1998c) and, in addition, the government
has pledged to act wherever authorities fail to
remedy clear performance failure in respect of
government Best Value targets. From the DE-
TR’s perspective, local accountability is to be
‘reinforced’ through these additional government
powers and the statutory imposition of Audit
Commission and inspectorate requirements
(DETR, 1998d: para 7.49). There is a sharp iro-
ny in additional powers being acquired by central
government in the struggle to enforce greater
local accountability. The government is introduc-
ing new legislation to take new powers to
support flexible and constructive intervention”
involving a wide range of regulatory mechanisms
(DETR, 1998d: para 7.47):
imposing an action plan and deadlines for
specified improvements;
imposing external management regimes;
putting out services to competition;
removing services from local authority control
entirely;
transferring responsibility to another authority
or third party.
The additional powers of regulation in the hands
of central government do not contradict the con-
cerns of Third Way theorists and policy makers.
In a fragmented and directionless society the
decentralisation of power could only increase
tensions and difficulties for central government.
Every New Labour paean to local involvement
and active communities ends with a rider that
brings the state back in and institutionalises gov-
ernment regulation at an even greater level than
before. Giddens, for example, emphasises that
devolved authority “can lead to fragmentation if
not balanced with a transfer of power upwards’
(Giddens, 1998: 78). Beck warns against any
“rationaldemocratic self-misunderstanding
that is bound to arise among the political class:
Politics must not be merely rational in a
democratic society, it must also be emo-
tional. Efficient solutions are important,
but so are passions, the ability to listen ...
Community spirit, which many obviously
miss so painfully, is formed only in the
symbols created and affirmed in public
speaking and listening. (Beck, 1998: 16)
What is being devolved downwards and outwards
is symbolic participation and consultation, not
power or accountability.
The therapeutic meaning of
democracy
Several commentators have criticised the new
range of ‘consultation’ exercises proposed by the
government, highlighting the emphasis on tech-
nical forms of involvement over institutional
change (Brooks, 1999; Sanderson, 1999). The
government, for example, has widely flagged up
the use of referendums, believing that councils
“should see and use referendums as an impor-
tant tool to give local people a bigger say.
However, apart from their instrumental use to
impose the executive/backbench division they
will be ‘neither obligatory or binding’ and pure-
ly intended for consultation purposes (DETR,
1998d: para 4.8). The DETR guide on participa-
tion techniques adds a long list of other potential
mechanisms to be used by local authorities, such
as: complaints/suggestions schemes; service sat-
isfaction surveys; other opinion polls; interactive
websites; citizens’ panels; cooption to scrutiny
committees; question and answer sessions with
the public; consultation documents; public meet-
ings; citizens juries; focus groups; visioning
exercises; service user forums; issue forums;
shared interest forums; area/neighbourhood fo-
rums; and user management of services (DETR,
1998e: Box 1). These schemes all attempt to in-
volve and create active citizens but none of them
give those involved any greater control over pol-
icy making.
These schemes for greater democratic partici-
pation focus more on involvement than on
enhancing accountability. This is understanda-
ble considering the central role of elections in
the democratic process. However, what is more
problematic in this regard is the downgrading of
local elections to merely an extension of these
new involvement strategies. To enhance the lev-
el of local participation, the government favours
annual local council polls. In ‘fallowyears, in
which there are no elections for local council-
lors, the government plans other elections, for
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
11
example for directly elected mayors, or the as-
sembly of the Greater London Authority (DETR,
1998d: para 4.11). A new system of gerryman-
dering will take place to reorganise local wards,
not to ensure a certain electoral outcome, but to
ensure that people have an equal opportunity to
participate:
This requires the same number of coun-
cillors in a ward or electoral division as
there are elections for the council in any
four-year period. The Government will
therefore take a power to direct the [Local
Government] Commission to take this cri-
terion into account when reviewing a
council’s electoral areas ... to redefine elec-
toral boundaries to increase the proportion
of the electorate involved in each local
election. (DETR, 1998d: para 4.15, 4.16)
This is very different to the traditional under-
standing of democracy, which was concerned not
with how often people voted but with their ca-
pacity to hold representatives accountable for
policy. When the vast majority of local council-
lors are essentially full-time community workers,
not accountable for local authority decision mak-
ing, it would appear impossible for them to stand
for re-election on the local authority’s policy
record. This turns local elections into little more
than personal popularity contests, doing little to
encourage wider policy debate. This could well
explain why the White Paper sees local repre-
sentation in entirely separate terms to policy
accountability. According to the DETR most
elected councillors fail the representative test as
they do not reflect the make-up of their com-
munity only a quarter are women, only half
are employed or self-employed and ethnic mi-
norities are seriously under-represented” (DETR,
1998d: paras 1.13, 3.59–3.61). Even the repre-
sentative nature of elected local councillors is
understood by the DETR in terms of ‘inclusion’
more than policy accountability.
The discussion of the ‘democratic renewal of
local politics has little to do with democratic
content. While it is possible for democratic
accountability to be enhanced through more in-
clusive approaches to policy making, this should
not be assumed prior to a study of the institu-
tional relationships involved. Unfortunately, even
critical commentators focus on the shortcomings
of the reforms at the level of inclusion rather than
considering the relations of democratic account-
ability (Pratchett, 1999; Sanderson, 1999). Josie
Brooks, for example, fears that ‘participation’
and ‘consultation’ are at risk of being used inter-
changeably” (1999: 52). However, this misses
the point that both participation and consulta-
tion relate to levels of individual engagement or
involvement rather tha n mechanisms of
accountability.
The focus on the level of individual ‘inclu-
sion’, as opposed to the broader relationship of
accountability of power holders, is a potent dem-
onstration of the shift from a po litical
understanding of democracy, as a collective de-
cision-making process, to a therapeutic one,
concerned with an individual’s subjective per-
spective. James Nolans recent book The
therapeutic state provides a substantial US study
of government institutional experimentation that
seeks to connect with society at the individual
level (1998). He sees this as a two-way process
as policy makers are responding to the fact that
fewer and fewer people relate to government
through the collective perspective of social goals
and interests. As preoccupation with individual
feelings shapes perceptions of the political sphere
“the citizen recedes and the therapeutic self pre-
vails” (1998: 6). His approach indicates that the
real benefits of involvement in consultation are
to be seen in terms of individual expression rather
than collective decision making.
For New Labour strategists, the links with an
increasingly fragmented society can only be built
through a variety of ‘subject-led’, ‘community-
centred initiatives. The concern for active
citizens to gain recognition’ and the ‘equality
of esteem revolves around involvement rather
than political accountability or policy changes.
This is therapeutic politics because the aim of
‘giving a voice to local people is primarily de-
signed to give individuals a feeling of greater
inclusion and sense of community. In this respect,
government thinking closely follo ws the
approach of the influential political theorist Jur-
gen Habermas in focusing on individual inclusion
over collective accountability, stressing the
importance of ‘communicative’ or ‘dialogic de-
mocracy. This perspective shifts the focus of the
political framework away from the representation
12
and aggregation of individual interests towards
an emphasis on the value of individual self-ex-
pression in shared participatory dialogue
(Habermas, 1984). The emphasis on ensuring that
all individual voices are heard is astutely recog-
nised by Anthony Giddens as a democracy of
the emotions” (1994: 16). Communities are cre-
ated not by involvement in a collective political
project or through some other form of social en-
gagement but through the collective expression
of individual feelings.
The government is reluctant to make voting
compulsory, but the trend is for people to have
less and less choice about democratic participa-
tion more broadly. This is because democratic
‘inclusion’ is seen as a central mechanism in the
re-creation of social bonds. This new importance
is reflected in the fact that the Government Ad-
visory Group on the Teaching of Citizenship and
Democracy recommends that citizenship educa-
tion in schools should be compulsory from the
age of five. No one should be ‘un-included’ un-
der this new approach; the government auditors
will be monitoring local councils asking ‘who is
missing’ from their consultation lists and the new
monitoring framework specifically calls for the
inclusion of ‘hard to reach’ groups including ru-
ral communities, single parents, young people
and special needs groups (DETR, 1998e: Box
9). This helps to explain why the government is
so keen on interactive technology that offers new
ways to get ‘in touch’ and involve individuals,
as well as groups, through new points of contact
with people at shopping centres and libraries, and
even in their own homes (DETR, 1998a: para
4.26). The discussion around the benefits of new
technologies for democratic ‘inclusion’ illustrates
the central problem (Percy-Smith, 1995). Even
if it was possible for the government to get ‘in
touch with more people, it is questionable
whether these new mechanisms could substitute
for old forms of social cohesion.
Drawn together through ‘social exclusion’ in-
itiatives, the ‘hard-to-involve will be enmeshed
in new sets of direct and indirect links to local
government and other regulatory bodies. How-
ever, these forums and associations, established
by local authority consultation mechanisms, have
only a limited capacity for deliberation, restrict-
ed by the policy framework and monitoring needs
of council managers and central government.
Some commentators argue that, despite these lim-
its, the mere fact of involvement will help to
educate local people in ‘civic values and ‘com-
munity responsibilities, or at least enhance their
sense of self-esteem and self-worth (Phillips,
1994, 1996; Barnes, 1999; Pratchett, 1999). To
the individual benefits at this moral or emotion-
al level should of course be added the very real
advantages that can accrue to newly ‘included’
groups and individuals in terms of public recog-
nition and access to resources. However, the
members of these new therapeutic ‘communities’
will share little sense of the active, collective
engagement that was part and parcel of involve-
ment in autonomously organised grassroots
community associations.
There is a difference between individuals be-
ing actively brought together through enthusiasm
about some collective project, such as a cam-
paign around local services, and the passive
gathering of individuals, by local councils, for
the purposes of education, voting or consulta-
tion exercises. Active and engaged citizens
cannot be created by government fiat or the pro-
liferation of council-established ‘citizen forums’.
Political engagement and community commit-
ment can only be generated by engaging people’s
active side. The wide range of citizen commit-
tees organised around areas or issues engage the
passive side of individuals, whose only connec-
tion is the use of a facility or service, or that they
share the same age range or postcode. Because
the aim is to feed back opinions and ideas for
the council to act on, the views of individuals
are neither challenged nor tested, and there is no
need to reach a collective agreement or to take
the arguments out to the community. This proc-
ess feeds passivity and institutionalises an
individual perspective rather than challenging it.
This is a far cry from citizen activity to in-
volve the community politically, encouraged by
liberal democracy theorists, such as Alexis de
Tocqville and John Stuart Mill (Mill, 1998: 229;
de Tocqville, 1945: 2: 124). Establishing a fo-
rum and calling it a citizen group may be
auditable by the Best Value inspectorate but has
nothing in common with autonomously organ-
ised citizen groups which, in the process of
actively winning support for their objectives,
have to clarify and test out their ideas, and in-
volve and engage with the local community.
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
13
Whether a citizens’ panel, established by a local
authority, has 200 or 2,000, or even 20,000, mem-
bers it cannot, of itself, create or develop any
collective community interest, any more than fill-
ing in a customer satisfaction survey at a
particular supermarket creates or reinforces any
community bond between shoppers. The new
local authority structures may bring people to-
gether and may keep people in touch’ with
government but they cannot overcome the atom-
isation and fragmentation that lies behind the
government’s concern with the “rebirth of dem-
ocratic local government. In fact, the new
forums and consultation groups, through the pro-
motion of democratic participation as little more
than consciousness raising and customer feed-
back, are more likely to institutionalise a network
of passive individuals than create or empower
active citizens.
Conclusion
It would appear that the government’s claim that
the Local Government Bill restores ‘a new dem-
ocratic legitimacy’ to local authorities is open to
question, considering the restriction of policy-
making powers within the council and the greater
mechanisms of monitoring and centralised reg-
ulation available to central government. The
streamlining of administrative procedures may
speed up decision making but it restricts further
the control of local people and local councils over
policy making.
This article suggests that increasing the ac-
countability of local people in decision-making
processes was not, in fact, the central motiva-
tion behind these reforms. Governm ent
exhortations for greater participation in local
authority affairs and the encouragement of ac-
tive citizens can be better understood within a
context of the desire to establish new mechanisms
of inclusion and involvement as a means of so-
cial co hesion. Even considered from this
perspective, the reform proposals seem unlikely
to be able to meet the desired aims because a
new brand of involved and responsible citizen-
ship” cannot be created by government fiat. In
fact, the more democratic participation is seen
as a tool of social policy, designed to address
questions of social cohesion, the less likely it is
that politically engaged citizens will emerge.
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David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state

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© The Policy Press, 2000 ISSN 0305 5736 Po P licy o & licy Poli& ti Po cs litics vol v 29 o l 29 no 1: no 3– 1 14
Active citizens and the therapeutic state: the role of
democratic participation in local government reform David Chandler English
The Local Government Bill and the White and Green Papers informing it claim to deliver an agenda
of democratic renewal. The reforms promise to reconnect local councils with local communities
through a process of political renewal, a new statutory duty of community-wide consultation and the
encouragement of active citizenship. This article assesses whether the plans for increased popular
engagement in consultation processes actually develop democratic accountability, and suggests that,
although the current proposals may institutionalise new links between government and community
groups and individuals, they will provide little local control over policy making. Français
Le projet de loi du Gouvernement Local, et les différents livres Blancs édités à ce sujet, prétend
délivrer un programme de renouveau démocratique. La réforme promet de rétablir la communication
entre les conseils municipaux et les communautés locales par le moyen d’un processus de
renouvellement politique, un nouveau devoir défini par la loi pour une consultation communautaire
générale et l’encouragement à une citoyenneté active. Cet article évalue si les projets pour un
engagement populaire croissant dans les processus de consultation développent réellement une
responsabilité démocratique, et il suggère que malgré le fait que les propositions actuelles puissent
institutionnaliser de nouveaux liens entre le gouvernement, les groupes de la communauté et les
particuliers, elles donneront très peu de contrôle local sur la prise de mesures politiques. Español
El Proyecto de Ley del Gobierno Local y los documentos White y Green que los informa, pretende
lanzar una agenda de renovación democrática. Las reformas prometen reconectar ayuntamientos
locales con comunidades locales a través de un proceso de renovación política, un nuevo deber
estatutario de amplia consulta comunitaria y la situación de una ciudadanía activa. Este artículo
examina los planes para el aumento de la participación popular en los procesos de consulta, para ver
si realmente desarrollan responsabilidad democrática. El artículo, también sugiere que aunque las
actuales propuestas pueden institucionalizar nuevos vínculos entre el gobierno, los grupos comunitarios
y los individuos, proporcionarán poco control sobre las decisiones políticas.
Key words: New Labour participation democratisation citizenship 3
Final submission 25 May 2000 Acceptance 29 June 2000
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state Introduction
1998a: Preface). The government’s local democ-
racy agenda highlights the need for a “radical
The New Labour local government reform agen-
refocusing of councils” traditional roles’ and for
da sets out a radical vision of democratic renewal,
a “fundamental shift of culture throughout local
‘bringing government back to the people’ through
government” (DETR, 1998d: Foreword). The
giving a greater say to local communities and
implications of opening up local government to
greater freedoms to local councils. Modernised
popular involvement will include not only the
local authorities have been promised new pow-
restructuring of local government, but also a ‘rad-
ers which will better reflect their policy-making
ical change’ in local councils’ relationships with
freedoms, greater accountability and enhanced
their communities and with central government
local leadership role. Within local authorities,
itself (DETR, 1998a: para 1.7).
elected councillors “will have greater freedom
This fundamental modernisation of local gov-
and a greater impact on the direction of the coun-
ernment is believed to be a necessity to tackle
cil and the services it provides” (DETR, 1998b:
the problems of social disengagement with com-
para 3.13). The new ‘open and in-touch coun-
munity affairs, the ‘culture of apathy’ and low
cils’ will be able to empower local communities
turnout at local polls. Support for government
radically, giving them “a real choice about how
initiatives at a local level is seen as more impor-
they are governed locally … [which] will give
tant than ever before, the government even
local communities real influence and power”
declaring that reinvigorated local government is
(DETR, 1998b: Foreword; para 2.9).
vital if it is to deliver its manifesto pledges “on
For some commentators, the democratisation
the ground where it matters” (DETR, 1998a: para
proposals are seen as merely the latest in a long
1.6). Today, organised party politics have little
line of local government reforms, with many
purchase on the rest of society; in fact there is
observers being cynical in the face of the prom-
large-scale alienation from, or at minimum an
ise of c hange (Boy ne , 1999 ; Le ach and
indifference to, political institutions (Giddens,
Wingfield, 1999; Tam, 1999). Others have wel-
1994: 109; Beck, 1998: 4). As leading New La-
comed these reforms as a positive move away
bour theoretician Anthony Giddens concludes:
from passive notions of consumer choice, epito-
“Political ideas today seem to have lost their ca-
mised by Citizen Charter initiatives under
pacity to inspire and political leaders their ability
Conservative rule, holding out the promise of
to lead” (1998: 2). With the government at West-
increasing popular accountability in decision
minster increasingly seen as distant from people’s
making (Elcock, 1998; West, 2000). This article
lives, New Labour’s local government reforms
analyses the reform proposals’ claims to enhance
seek to restore the links between the state and
local democracy and empowerment through a
society, by “bringing government to the people”:
consideration of the momentum behind local au-
thority reform. Reform is placed within the
The basic fact is that we all live somewhere
broader context of central government attempts
and we all have local loyalties … [this]
to address problems of social cohesion by re-
makes local democracy the best system …
building institutional linkages and, in the process,
It draws strength, purpose and dynamism
recasting the relationship between the state and
from local need, local loyalty, local expe-
society through the development of ‘active
rience and local knowledge. (Labour Party, citizenship’. 1995: 3)
The government’s need to get ‘in touch’ is not
A new role for local government
merely a reflection of the decline of national
The Department for the Environment, Transport
politics and the lack of popular involvement with
and the Regions (DETR) and central government
political parties. The problem of articulating a
launched the local government reform propos-
national ‘vision’ also reflects the fragmentation
als as part of “the rebirth of democratic local
of other collective, associational links between
government” a project seen as “vital to building
the state and society, from the falling member-
a modern Britain and a decent society” (DETR,
ship and influence of trade unions and working 4
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
men’s associations to the decline of the estab-
change in culture extends local government in-
lished church and the Women’s Institute. The
volvement with community participation projects
political repercussions of the collapse of these
being developed by other private and public bod-
collective institutions were raised in the 1980s ies (Martin, 1998: 5).
by communitarian theorists who warned that
In order to fulfil this cohering role the gov-
“markets and contracts ... do not create any so-
ernm ent requ ires c ou ncils to de ve lop “a
cial cohesion in and of themselves. They require
comprehensive strategy for promoting the well-
and use up the active identification of citizens
being of their area”. There will be a new statutory
with their communities as ‘social mortar’” (Beck,
force behind this interventionist vision in the
1998: 13). The policy advocates of the Third Way
“duty to promote the economic, social and envi-
share the communitarians’ focus on rebuilding
ronmental well-being of their areas” (DETR,
social cohesion, advocating a proactive and in-
1998d: para 8.8). This strategy is to involve in-
terventionist set of policies on behalf of both the
stitutionalising partnerships with a wide range
central and local state. Today, the intervention-
of agencies and organisations (DETR, 1998d:
ist project of recreating ‘social solidarity’ through para 8.21):
recasting the relationship between the state and
society is often termed democratisation (Held,
local people, individually and collectively
1993; Giddens, 1994, 1998). For leading Ger-
through community groups, local women’s
man social theorist Ulrich Beck:
organisations and residents’ associations; local business community;
The answer is: only by upgrading the lo- voluntary groups;
cal area of democracy, the towns and cities private organisations;
... All of this presumes, among other
public bodies (eg executive agencies of gov-
things, a repoliticization of municipal pol-
ernment, the new Regional Development
icy, indeed a rediscovery and redefinition
Agencies, Training and Enterprise Councils
of it by mobilizing programmes, ideas and
and National Health Service bodies). people... (1998: 16)
Local councils are to play an ‘enabling’ role,
The local state is cast in a new, much more so-
shaping policy through the development of ‘stra-
cially engaged, position in this perspective,
tegic partnerships’ in different policy areas, with
playing a crucial role in government attempts to
powers to address a much broader variety of con-
create new points of contact and links with a more
cerns, is sue s as va ria ble a s sustaina ble
individualised society. Prior to the White Paper
development, social exclusion, transport, health,
on local government reforms the desire to insti-
crime, education and training (DETR, 1998d:
tutionalise local authori ty involvement in
para 8.5). This enabling role, facilitating the in-
community-level initiatives was already clear.
volve ment of different public , private and
The Health White Paper and proposals for Health
voluntary organisations, all with distinct remits
Action Zones placed requirements on local au-
and responsibilities, may facilitate policy coor-
thorities to promote local involvement. Similarly,
dination, although the gains for local democracy
the Crime and Disorder Bill required local coun-
are less obvious, as the networked agencies will
cils to obtain the views of the public about the
maintain their own lines of accountability (Duffy
level and pattern of crime and argued for wide-
and Hutchinson, 1997; Tam, 1999: 29). The new
spread consultation about strategies for reducing
interventionist role of local government does not
crime and disorder (DETR, 1998e: para 1.3). The
stop with networking existing groups. A DETR
Local Government Bill extends this process fur-
guidance paper concentrates solely “on public
ther, with the government instructing local
participation that is deliberately stimulated by
authorities to play a leading and coordinating role
local authorities” (DETR, 1998e: Introduction).
in bringing different agencies together. The new
The DETR aims are ambitiously laid out: “We
reform proposals call for “consultation and par-
want to see any culture of indifference about lo-
ticipation [to be] embedded into the culture of
cal democracy dispersed, and local people taking
all councils” (DETR, 1998d: para 4.6). This
a lively interest in their council and its affairs” 5
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
(DETR, 1998d: para 1.21). A key problem is that
interactive approach is to include citizenship ed-
only a small percentage of the population is in-
ucation, community development and targeted
volved in collective groups even at a local level.
initiatives aimed at young people or other groups
A further stage in this process is the attempt to
who are difficult to involve (DETR, 1998e: para
involve the uninvolved, to create and promote 3.2).
the model of the ‘active citizen’:
As the DETR states: “Local government mat-
ters” (DETR, 1998a: para 1.1). However, it does
In a society where tradition and custom
not matter in the way it did in the past: “There is
are losing their hold, the only route to the
no future in the old models of councils trying to
establishing of authority is via democra-
plan and run most services” (DETR, 1998d: Fore-
cy. The ne w ind ividu alism doe sn’t
word). Local councils are no longer centrally
inevitably corrode authority, but demands
responsible for raising revenue and for the di-
it be recast on an active and participatory
rect provision of services. Local authorities have basis. (Giddens, 1998: 66)
languished for the past two decades, increasing-
ly marginalised politically and reduced to
Local government democratisation aims to cre-
administrating central government budgets
ate new institutional forms linking the state to a
(Jameson, 2000). Since 1979, over 200 Acts of
much more atomised and fragmented society,
Parliament have taken powers away from local
providing new mechanisms of social cohesion.
authority control, while the locally raised share
Giddens, for example, considers ways of reinte-
of council spending has fallen from 50% to less
grating society through “forms of democracy
than 20% (Labour Party, 1995: 7, 15). David
other than the orthodox voting process” in order
Beetham and other commentators have, in fact,
for governments to “re-establish more direct con-
urged central government to enhance local au-
tact with citizens … through ‘experiments with
thority auton om y as a precond ition for
democracy’ – local direct democracy, electronic
democratic renewal (Beetham 1996; Gray and
referenda, citizen’s juries and other possibilities” Jenkins, 1999: 38).
(1998: 75). Local authorities had already made
Local authorities matter today, but not because
major strides to increase involvement and con-
the government has decided to overhaul the fund-
sultation prior to the current reform proposals.
ing relationships that force local councils to rely
In 1997, 85% had undertaken public meetings
on central government spending priorities and
or issued consultative documents, and virtually
accede to a wide range of central targets set by
all councils had schemes providing feedback
statutory regulation. In fact, central government’s
from service users (DETR, 1998d: para 1.1).
administrative regulatory control over local au-
Most local authorities had already taken up more
thorities is set to be enhanced through the current
innovative proposals for participation: around
batch of reforms. Local authorities matter be-
50% had focus groups; approximately a quarter
cause, with the c ollapse of m edia ting
had visioning exercises, some user management
associational links between the state and socie-
of services and interactive websites; and around
ty, they are seen as vital in establishing new
one in five already had citizens’ panels or were
points of contact and coherence. The fragment-
experimenting with citizens’ juries (DETR,
ed nature of modern society means that, to fill 1998e: para 1.1).
this vacuum or facilitate ‘joined-up government’,
For the DETR this, already extensive, use of
links have to be constituted on a local level by
innovative approaches to community involve-
proactive local state bodies. In effect, these re-
ment was still not adequate, and the consultation
forms attempt to revitalise the shaky relationship
documents stress the “need to develop deeper
between the citizen and the state through the ren-
ways of involving communities” (DETR, 1998e:
ovation of local political institutions (Gray and
para 1.2). The DETR’s Guidance on enhancing
Jenkins, 1999: 33). As Gerry Stoker notes, local
public participation in local government urges
authorities are well placed to play this new role
local authorities to “go out to the public” and
because of their institutional permanence,
work at “extending invitations to non-joiners”
providing “a solid frame for developing the long-
through building community capacity. This
term commitment associated with networked, 6
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
integrated action” (1996: 205). The proposed
A local authority can call a referendum for an
changes to local government are intended to turn
elected mayor, the government can order one it-
local authorities into a mechanism for social co-
self or 5% of the electorate can petition for a
hesion, to “help councils to engage with their
referendum. These proposals mean that the lo-
local communities more effectively” (DETR,
cal electorate will be involved in deciding on the 1998d: para 4.1):
form of local government that they are to have.
However, there is to be no local say, by the elect-
The Government has a clear vision of suc-
ed councils or directly by the electorate, on the
cessfully modernised local government. It
abolition of the existing local authority system.
will be characterised by councils which
If the electorate rejects the proposal for an elect-
once again engage directly with their lo-
ed m ayo r, the governme nt expe cts local
cal communit ies. Such councils will
authorities to adopt another of the proposals
actively promote public participation. (DETR, 1998b: para 2.16). (DETR, 1998a: para 1.8)
The choice between these three models is de-
scribed by the DETR as opening “up a much
More participation, less
richer variety of local democratic structures” democracy
(DETR, 1998d: para 3.28). However, this ‘rich
variety’ is to be strictly regulated under the Lo-
The Local Government Bill develops a new set
cal Government Bill and statutory instruments
of structures at local authority level and a new
which will specify the ‘key broad parameters’ of
set of institutional links between central and lo-
any new constitution, including the requirements
cal government and between local government
of political and officer positions and their roles
and the wider community. The local government
and relationships (DETR, 1998b: para 3.6). In
reforms are being promoted as empowering for
order for local democracy to be safeguarded, lo-
both local communities and local councils. The
cal councils’ freedom to decide their own
government makes much of letting local people
timetable for change will be limited by the gov- decide the new arrangements:
ernment’s proposal for “reserve power to tackle cases of abuse or inertia”:
Asking people how they want their com-
munity governed is not enough. It is right
Where a council has developed proposals
for local people themselves to take the
with a timetable but is failing to act upon
decisions about new forms of local gov-
them, or has neglected to develop any pro-
ernance which involve such radical change
posals at all, the Government will have the
as introducing new elections. (DETR,
power to require the council to hold a ref- 1998b: para 2.9)
erendum asking the local electorate to
support one of the approved models.
Councils can choose between three models: hav- (DETR, 1998d: para 3.33)
ing a directly elected mayor with a cabinet; a
cabinet with a leader; or a directly elected may-
Even where the council itself decides to hold a
or with a coun cil manager. Resistance to
referendum the government will have the power
modernisation, under these choices, is seen as
to lay down the detailed proposal for a new form
merely endorsing the urgency of the proposed
of local governance, the form of wording, the
reforms. Reluctance to take up the reform pro-
time of the referendum and other procedural
gramme is seen by the DETR as reflecting a
matters (DETR, 1998b: para 2.13).
‘paternalistic culture’, demonstrating a concern
The new structures being imposed at local
with ‘protecting vested interests’, or, yet worse,
government level effectively split local govern-
as indicating the existence of an “inward look-
ment in two, institutionalising a sharp distinction
ing culture [that] can open the door to corruption
between the executive and representative roles.
and wrongdoing” (DETR, 1998d: Ch 1). The
As the DETR states: “These benefits are the
preferred choice of the government is for one of
greater, the more the representative role and the
the options involving a directly elected mayor.
executive role are separated” (DETR, 1998a: 7
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
para 5.14). Under each model there is a strong
holding more local surgeries. The majority of
executive, responsible for policy preparation and
local councillors, freed from their role in policy
implementation. The executive would number as
making, have an ‘enhanced role’, their efforts
few as three, under the council manager form,
refocused “on becoming the engine for public
and a maximum of ten councillors or 15% of the
participation in decision- making” (DETR,
council under the other forms. The executive,
1998b: Postscript). The DETR believes these
which will not have to reflect the political bal-
councillors “will be accountable, strong, local
ance of the authority, will receive greatly
representatives for their area”:
enhanced powers, with a directly elected mayor
able to veto a council decision and overrule the
They will bring their constituents’ views,
council in order to impose a balanced budget.
concerns and grievances to the council
One area where there will be no choice is the
through their council’s structures. Their
abolition of the old committee system. The gov-
role will be to represent the people to the
ernm ent reform prop osals claim that the
council rather than to defend the council
committee system ‘weakens local accountabili-
to the people ... Each councillor will be-
ty’ by not providing effective leadership; this
come a champion of their community
being one factor discouraging people from vot-
defending the public interest in the coun-
ing, as it was not clear who within the council
cil and channelling the grievances, needs
was making the decisions (DETR, 1998b: paras
and aspirations of their electorate into the
1.10, 1.19). The committee system was also held
scrutiny process. In-touch local council-
to be undemocratic because the important deci-
lors, aware of and responsive to the needs
sions were often made by political groups
of those they represent, will have a great-
‘meeting behind closed doors’ (DETR, 1998a:
er say in the formulation of policy and the
para. 5.4). This system meant that councillors
solving of local problems than they could
wasted too much time in meetings where they
have within current committee structures.
had little influence, the amount of time spent also
(DETR, 1998d: paras 3.42, 3.43)
being a major deterrent to those with family and
work commitments (DETR, 1998a: para 5.27).
While it is a positive step to encourage council-
Instead, the committee system will be replaced
lors to be more aware of their constituents’ needs
by one or more overview or scrutiny commit-
their representative capacity is at the same time
tees, overseeing the work of the executive. This
being diminished. Perversely, it is the ‘in-touch’
will cut back the time the majority of council-
councillors that will have much less say in poli-
lors spend in council meetings, and clarify policy
cy formulation (Rao, 1999: 267). In fact, calling
responsibilities, with the executive councillors
the non-executive councillors ‘backbenchers’ is
having responsibility for decision making and
clearly misleading as it invites unwarranted com-
defending council policy to the public, while the
parisons with the parliamentary division of
backbench councillors have the lead responsi-
members’ roles (Brooks, 1999: 50). In the House
bility for scrutiny as informed representatives of
of Commons, backbenchers are involved in de-
the people. The new scrutiny committees will:
cision making and have to ratify propose d
legislation by majority vote; they do not merely
…review decisions taken by the executive
scrutinise policy that has already been agreed. It
and how it is implementing council policy,
would be considered highly undemocratic for the
and make reports and recommendations,
government to try to “break the attendance cul-
including proposals for changes to poli-
ture” of MPs, yet, in the cause of ‘local
cies or practices, to the executive or
accountability’, this is precisely the declared
council as appropriate. (DETR, 1998b:
policy for local authority council members para 3.19) (DETR, 1998d: para 3.56).
The ‘comm un ity c ham pions’ will be
While the executive councillors spend time in
responsible for organising and getting involved
stuffy policy-making meetings, the ‘backbench-
with local community consultation schemes.
ers’ will be attending residents’ meetings and
Area Based Neighbourhood Committees and 8
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
Community Forums as well as Interest and User
will be an ongoing process, emphasising contin-
Group Forums will be encouraged to form part
uous improvement towards national targets in
of, or feed in to, the scrutiny structure and will
quality and cost and efficiency (Sanderson,
help inform a number of consultation initiatives.
1998). The minimum target set by the Best Val-
Greater community involvement and policy-
ue regime is that, within five years, standards
making openness potentially marks a positive
should be consistent with those of the top 25%
improvement on the closed world of pre-meet-
of all local authorities at the time the standards
ing party caucuses of the past. However, there is are set.
a fundamental difference between the, at least
Opportunities to spend will be tied to results
formal, political accountability of the old com-
through the Best Value scheme and the ‘beacon
mittee system, where councillors voted on policy,
councils’ initiative. This new initiative will “take
and the new regimes of scrutiny and consulta-
account of performance in service delivery
tion which involve no final accountability over
against national and local performance targets
policy-making power. Councillors involved in
and performance indicators”, and also “have re-
scrutiny may have the right to interview execu-
gard to inspectorate reports and auditors’
tive officers and commission reports, but can
statements on financial management” (DETR,
only make recommendations for the executive
1998d: para 2.21). Each local authority will have
to consider. The change in status of the majority
to set annual targets for quality, efficiency and
of local councillors is statutorily enforced by the
cost consistent with these targets. However, giv-
government requirement that overview or scru-
en the disparities in local authority performance
tiny committees will not be able to take decisions
it seems unlikely that many councils will be able
or exercise responsibilities on behalf of the coun-
to achieve the targets set, with less well-off coun-
cil (DETR, 1998 b: para 3.1 8). The more
cils being even less likely to benefit from
‘in-touch’ backbench councillors may be the peo-
additional funding. These centrally defined tar-
ple’s representatives but apparently can only
gets have been criticised as even more likely to
represent the people by being freed from the
“distort local authority behaviour and undermine
onerous task of policy making and political ac-
local democratic accountability” (Boyne, 1999:
countability that goes with it.
4). In fact, as several commentators have noted,
Central government, in fact, looks set to ac-
diversity and freedom in local government serv-
quire greater regulatory control over local
ice delivery can only be reduced by the DETR
authorities, through the process of ‘empowering
focus on national auditability (Brooks, 1999: 51).
communities’. This apparent contradiction is
Just as Best Value gives little leeway for local
starkly highlighted in the new statutory duty on
variation, the content of local authority perform-
councils to consult and engage with their local
ance plans, which summarise council objectives
communities over producing a community plan
and communicate them to the public, will equal-
and the provisions of Best Value (DETR, 1998e:
ly be tightly prescribed by the government itself
para 1.3). This is portrayed as a transfer of deci-
(Boyne, 1999: 5). While the government central-
sion-making power away from the centre, yet,
ly determines the service delivery targets and
under the statutory duty of consultation and new
performance plans, it seems clear that the DE-
policy frameworks, this will further undermine
TR’s concern, that these targets should include a
local authority autonomy through creating a
statutory duty of community consultation, has
whole host of new centrally regulated monitor-
less to do with policy content than with promot- ing regimes.
ing local involvement. To meet the consultation
Best Value, replacing Compulsory Competi-
requirements, local authorities will have to con-
tive Tendering, is a top-down managerial
vince the new Best Value inspectorate and the
imposition with a rolling programme of reviews
Audit Commission “that they have a high level
comparing service delivery between local author-
of support from local people and the business
ities. Under the new monitoring programme of
community” (DETR, 1998d: para 2.21).
the Audit Commission, Local Government Au-
Conformity with central government admin-
thority, Improvement and Development Agency
istrative prioritie s invo lves m ore tha n
and the DETR, central government regulation
target-setting and monitoring regimes. There will 9
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
be the creation of new disciplinary bodies which
symbols created and affirmed in public
will be part of the ‘new ethical framework’
speaking and listening. (Beck, 1998: 16)
(DETR, 1998c) and, in addition, the government
has pledged to act wherever authorities fail to
What is being devolved downwards and outwards
remedy clear performance failure in respect of
is symbolic participation and consultation, not
government Best Value targets. From the DE- power or accountability.
TR’s perspective, local accountability is to be
‘reinforced’ through these additional government
The therapeutic meaning of
powers and the statutory imposition of Audit
Commission and inspectorate requirements democracy
(DETR, 1998d: para 7.49). There is a sharp iro-
Several commentators have criticised the new
ny in additional powers being acquired by central
range of ‘consultation’ exercises proposed by the
government in the struggle to enforce greater
government, highlighting the emphasis on tech-
local accountability. The government is introduc-
nical forms of involvement over institutional
ing new legislation “to take new powers to
change (Brooks, 1999; Sanderson, 1999). The
support flexible and constructive intervention”
government, for example, has widely flagged up
involving a wide range of regulatory mechanisms
the use of referendums, believing that councils (DETR, 1998d: para 7.47):
“should see and use referendums as an impor-
tant tool to give local people a bigger say”.
imposing an action plan and deadlines for
However, apart from their instrumental use to specified improvements;
impose the executive/backbench division they
imposing external management regimes;
will be ‘neither obligatory or binding’ and pure-
putting out services to competition;
ly intended for consultation purposes (DETR,
removing services from local authority control
1998d: para 4.8). The DETR guide on participa- entirely;
tion techniques adds a long list of other potential
transferring responsibility to another authority
mechanisms to be used by local authorities, such or third party.
as: complaints/suggestions schemes; service sat-
isfaction surveys; other opinion polls; interactive
The additional powers of regulation in the hands
websites; citizens’ panels; cooption to scrutiny
of central government do not contradict the con-
committees; question and answer sessions with
cerns of Third Way theorists and policy makers.
the public; consultation documents; public meet-
In a fragmented and directionless society the
ings; citizens’ juries; focus groups; visioning
decentralisation of power could only increase
exercises; service user forums; issue forums;
tensions and difficulties for central government.
shared interest forums; area/neighbourhood fo-
Every New Labour paean to local involvement
rums; and user management of services (DETR,
and active communities ends with a rider that
1998e: Box 1). These schemes all attempt to in-
brings the state back in and institutionalises gov-
volve and create active citizens but none of them
ernment regulation at an even greater level than
give those involved any greater control over pol-
before. Giddens, for example, emphasises that icy making.
devolved authority “can lead to fragmentation if
These schemes for greater democratic partici-
not balanced with a transfer of power ‘upwards’”
pation focus more on involvem ent than on
(Giddens, 1998: 78). Beck warns against any
enhancing accountability. This is understanda-
“rational–democratic self-misunderstanding”
ble considering the central role of elections in
that is bound to arise among the political class:
the democratic process. However, what is more
problematic in this regard is the downgrading of
Politics must not be merely rational in a
local elections to merely an extension of these
democratic society, it must also be emo-
new involvement strategies. To enhance the lev-
tional. Efficient solutions are important,
el of local participation, the government favours
but so are passions, the ability to listen ...
annual local council polls. In ‘fallow’ years, in
Community spirit, which many obviously
which there are no elections for local council-
miss so painfully, is formed only in the
lors, the government plans other elections, for 10
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
example for directly elected mayors, or the as-
critical commentators focus on the shortcomings
sembly of the Greater London Authority (DETR,
of the reforms at the level of inclusion rather than
1998d: para 4.11). A new system of gerryman-
considering the relations of democratic account-
dering will take place to reorganise local wards,
ability (Pratchett, 1999; Sanderson, 1999). Josie
not to ensure a certain electoral outcome, but to
Brooks, for example, fears that “‘participation’
ensure that people have an equal opportunity to
and ‘consultation’ are at risk of being used inter- participate:
changeably” (1999: 52). However, this misses
the point that both participation and consulta-
This requires the same number of coun-
tion relate to levels of individual engagement or
cillors in a ward or electoral division as
invo lvem ent ra ther tha n me chanism s of
there are elections for the council in any accountability.
four-year period. The Government will
The focus on the level of individual ‘inclu-
therefore take a power to direct the [Local
sion’, as opposed to the broader relationship of
Government] Commission to take this cri-
accountability of power holders, is a potent dem-
terion into account when reviewing a
on stra tion of the shift from a po litical
council’s electoral areas ... to redefine elec-
understanding of democracy, as a collective de-
toral boundaries to increase the proportion
cision-making process, to a therapeutic one,
of the electorate involved in each local
concerned with an individual’s subjective per-
election. (DETR, 1998d: para 4.15, 4.16)
spective. James Nolan’s recent book The
therapeutic state
provides a substantial US study
This is very different to the traditional under-
of government institutional experimentation that
standing of democracy, which was concerned not
seeks to connect with society at the individual
with how often people voted but with their ca-
level (1998). He sees this as a two-way process
pacity to hold representatives accountable for
as policy makers are responding to the fact that
policy. When the vast majority of local council-
fewer and fewer people relate to government
lors are essentially full-time community workers,
through the collective perspective of social goals
not accountable for local authority decision mak-
and interests. As preoccupation with individual
ing, it would appear impossible for them to stand
feelings shapes perceptions of the political sphere
for re-election on the local authority’s policy
“the citizen recedes and the therapeutic self pre-
record. This turns local elections into little more
vails” (1998: 6). His approach indicates that the
than personal popularity contests, doing little to
real benefits of involvement in consultation are
encourage wider policy debate. This could well
to be seen in terms of individual expression rather
explain why the White Paper sees local repre-
than collective decision making.
sentation in entirely separate terms to policy
For New Labour strategists, the links with an
accountability. According to the DETR most
increasingly fragmented society can only be built
elected councillors fail the representative test as
through a variety of ‘subject-led’, ‘community-
they “do not reflect the make-up of their com-
centred’ initiatives. The concern for active
munity – only a quarter are women, only half
citizens to gain ‘recognition’ and the ‘equality
are employed or self-employed and ethnic mi-
of esteem’ revolves around involvement rather
norities are seriously under-represented” (DETR,
than political accountability or policy changes.
1998d: paras 1.13, 3.59–3.61). Even the repre-
This is therapeutic politics because the aim of
sentative nature of elected local councillors is
‘giving a voice’ to local people is primarily de-
understood by the DETR in terms of ‘inclusion’
signed to give individuals a feeling of greater
more than policy accountability.
inclusion and sense of community. In this respect,
The discussion of the ‘democratic renewal of
gov ernment think ing closely follows the
local politics’ has little to do with democratic
approach of the influential political theorist Jur-
content. While it is possible for democratic
gen Habermas in focusing on individual inclusion
accountability to be enhanced through more in-
over collective accountability, stressing the
clusive approaches to policy making, this should
importance of ‘communicative’ or ‘dialogic’ de-
not be assumed prior to a study of the institu-
mocracy. This perspective shifts the focus of the
tional relationships involved. Unfortunately, even
political framework away from the representation 11
David Chandler: Active citizens and the therapeutic state
and aggregation of individual interests towards
Some commentators argue that, despite these lim-
an emphasis on the value of individual self-ex-
its, the mere fact of involvement will help to
pression in shared participatory dialog ue
educate local people in ‘civic values’ and ‘com-
(Habermas, 1984). The emphasis on ensuring that
munity responsibilities’, or at least enhance their
all individual voices are heard is astutely recog-
sense of self-esteem and self-worth (Phillips,
nised by Anthony Giddens as a “democracy of
1994, 1996; Barnes, 1999; Pratchett, 1999). To
the emotions” (1994: 16). Communities are cre-
the individual benefits at this moral or emotion-
ated not by involvement in a collective political
al level should of course be added the very real
project or through some other form of social en-
advantages that can accrue to newly ‘included’
gagement but through the collective expression
groups and individuals in terms of public recog- of individual feelings.
nition and access to resources. However, the
The government is reluctant to make voting
members of these new therapeutic ‘communities’
compulsory, but the trend is for people to have
will share little sense of the active, collective
less and less choice about democratic participa-
engagement that was part and parcel of involve-
tion more broadly. This is because democratic
ment in autonomously organised grassroots
‘inclusion’ is seen as a central mechanism in the community associations.
re-creation of social bonds. This new importance
There is a difference between individuals be-
is reflected in the fact that the Government Ad-
ing actively brought together through enthusiasm
visory Group on the Teaching of Citizenship and
about some collective project, such as a cam-
Democracy recommends that citizenship educa-
paign around local services, and the passive
tion in schools should be compulsory from the
gathering of individuals, by local councils, for
age of five. No one should be ‘un-included’ un-
the purposes of education, voting or consulta-
der this new approach; the government auditors
tion exercises. Active and engaged citizens
will be monitoring local councils asking ‘who is
cannot be created by government fiat or the pro-
missing’ from their consultation lists and the new
liferation of council-established ‘citizen forums’.
monitoring framework specifically calls for the
Political engagement and community commit-
inclusion of ‘hard to reach’ groups including ru-
ment can only be generated by engaging people’s
ral communities, single parents, young people
active side. The wide range of citizen commit-
and special needs groups (DETR, 1998e: Box
tees organised around areas or issues engage the
9). This helps to explain why the government is
passive side of individuals, whose only connec-
so keen on interactive technology that offers new
tion is the use of a facility or service, or that they
ways to get ‘in touch’ and involve individuals,
share the same age range or postcode. Because
as well as groups, through new points of contact
the aim is to feed back opinions and ideas for
with people at shopping centres and libraries, and
the council to act on, the views of individuals
even in their own homes (DETR, 1998a: para
are neither challenged nor tested, and there is no
4.26). The discussion around the benefits of new
need to reach a collective agreement or to take
technologies for democratic ‘inclusion’ illustrates
the arguments out to the community. This proc-
the central problem (Percy-Smith, 1995). Even
ess feeds passivity and institutionalises an
if it was possible for the government to get ‘in
individual perspective rather than challenging it.
touch’ with more people, it is questionable
This is a far cry from citizen activity to in-
whether these new mechanisms could substitute
volve the community politically, encouraged by
for old forms of social cohesion.
liberal democracy theorists, such as Alexis de
Drawn together through ‘social exclusion’ in-
Tocqville and John Stuart Mill (Mill, 1998: 229;
itiatives, the ‘hard-to-involve’ will be enmeshed
de Tocqville, 1945: 2: 124). Establishing a fo-
in new sets of direct and indirect links to local
rum and calling it a ‘citizen group’ may be
government and other regulatory bodies. How-
auditable by the Best Value inspectorate but has
ever, these forums and associations, established
nothing in common with autonomously organ-
by local authority consultation mechanisms, have
ised citizen groups which, in the process of
only a limited capacity for deliberation, restrict-
actively winning support for their objectives,
ed by the policy framework and monitoring needs
have to clarify and test out their ideas, and in-
of council managers and central government.
volve and engage with the local community. 12
Policy & Politics vol 29 no 1
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authority, has 200 or 2,000, or even 20,000, mem-
bers it cannot, of itself, create or develop any
Barnes, M. (1999) ‘Researching public
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Beck, U. (1998) Democracy without enemies,
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Beetham, D. (1996) ‘Theorising local
gether and may keep people ‘in touch’ with
democracy and local government’, in D. King
government but they cannot overcome the atom-
and G. Stoker (eds) Rethinking local
isation and fragmentation that lies behind the
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ocratic local government”. In fact, the new
Boyne, G.A. (1999) ‘Processes, performance
forums and consultation groups, through the pro-
and best value in local government’, Local
motion of democratic participation as little more
Government Studies, vol 25, no 2: 1–15.
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Brooks, J. (1999) ‘(Can) modern local
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of passive individuals than create or empower
Public Policy and Administration, vol 14, no active citizens. 1: 42–59.
de Tocqueville, A. (1945) Democracy in Conclusion
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It would appear that the government’s claim that
DETR (1998a) Modernising local government:
the Local Government Bill restores ‘a new dem-
Local democracy and community leadership,
ocratic legitimacy’ to local authorities is open to
London: Department of the Environment,
question, considering the restriction of policy- Transport and the Regions.
making powers within the council and the greater
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streamlining of administrative procedures may
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speed up decision making but it restricts further
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Department of the Environment, Transport policy making. and the Regions.
This article suggests that increasing the ac-
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processes was not, in fact, the central motiva-
touch with the people, London: Department
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of the Environment, Transport and the
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participation in local government, London:
context of the desire to establish new mechanisms
Department of the Environment, Transport
of inclusion and involvement as a means of so- and the Regions.
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