Culture models and organization change - Tài liệu tham khảo | Đại học Hoa Sen

Culture models and organization change Introduction
Throughout much of the twentieth century, research into organizations looked at how
most effectively to increase performance, productivity and profitability. Latterly
client/customer satisfaction and the satisfaction of employees came to be seen as central
to improved per- formance, and public service organizations were increasingly the subject
of study. It is worth noting that in the USA and in Europe major wars led to rapid increases
in research efforts as attempts were made to solve the novel problems presented by such
conflicts. These included learning how to select candidates for officer training in rapidly
expanding armed services and looking at the factors affecting productivity in factory
systems being rapidly expanded to manufacture weapons on a vast scale.
After the end of the Second World War in 1945 many observers argued that the Cold War,
other incipient conflicts around the world and the growing pressures of global competition,
alongside the demands of what Eisenhower famously called the ‘military–industrial com-
plex’, added substantial and continued impetus to this research effort and to the related
and impressive growth of business schools in the USA and elsewhere. (Professional schools
such as law schools, medical schools and the like were established earlier but the
emergence of business schools was a feature of the educational ‘landscape’ during that period.)
The twentieth century has been labelled as ‘the American century’ as America’s capitalist
organizations came to be dominant in sectors such as automobile and aircraft
manufacture. Moreover, American culture came to be almost the defining culture for big
cities around the world. American business, diplomacy and military power eventually
evolved into such a position that led scholars to cite the USA as the world’s only global
superpower, at least for the moment. Yet even as this position emerged there were clear
signs of change in the pos- ition of business in the USA relative to the rest of the world.
More particularly it is clear that while US businesses continue to deliver economic success
there are, nevertheless, US busi- nesses struggling to survive and prosper in mature sectors
such as automobile manufacture. This has led many thoughtful business leaders to raise new questions.
As long ago as 1986 Turner (1986) traced the emergence of interest in corporate
culture to both the decline in standards of manufacturing quality and design in the USA
and the challenge to the economic supremacy of the USA from Japan in particular. He
argued that the culture concept offers a new way of understanding organizations. The use
of corpor- ate culture appeared to offer analytical possibilities for explaining the success of Japanese 301 What is organization culture?
companies, at least in the 1960s and 1970s. Of course, there were other feasible
explana- tions, not least the need for Japan and Germany to re-equip their industry after
the war, but these were deemed to be insufficient in themselves to explain the observable
differences in performance and success. It is worth noting that literally hundreds of
research studies seek- ing to explain organizational performance by looking at structure,
innovation, technology, size, adaptation and so on tended to reveal statistically significant
correlations. However, it was also true that the factors studied provided an explanation of
only part of the variance in the dependent variable, commonly a ‘bundle’ of performance
measures. Researchers con- cluded that some other factor, not being measured, was at
work. It was not a long stretch from that position to conclude that the missing variable was culture.
Of course, such a view possessed powerful ‘face validity’. Just as the ‘frontier spirit’
thought to engender values of self-reliance, independence and enterprise was thought to
have been instrumental in the growth of American business, so observers now sought
simi- lar explanations for the success of Japanese enterprise in ‘consensus management’
Japanese style, alongside the adoption by Japanese corporations of American ideas such
as total quality management combined eventually with the ‘Toyota Manufacturing System’
incor- porating ideas which came to be known as ‘lean thinking’, ‘Kanban’ and so on.
While the explanation ultimately relates to changes in the way work is arranged, the
argument for why Japanese enterprises achieved advantage by making these changes
first was seen to include culture as one important source of explanation. What is organization culture?
Organization culture is commonly defined as the attitudes, values, beliefs, norms and cus-
toms which distinguish an organization from others. Organization culture is intangible and
difficult to measure. In fact there are many ways of defining organization culture. Elliot
Jacques (1952) referred to ‘customary and traditional ways of thinking and doing
things’, noting that new employees must learn to adopt them sufficiently to gain
acceptance in the organization. Schwartz and Davis (1981) note that culture is both about
beliefs and expec- tations while Lorsch (1986) refers to the beliefs of ‘top managers’.
Conversely, Kotter and Hesketh (1992) note the importance of community and its
preservation within any defini- tion of culture, effectively arguing that the urge to create
identity and ensure survival is what gives a culture impact.
Johnson (1988) sets out a ‘cultural web’, noting a number of components which help in
the definition of organization culture:
1 The organizational paradigm. What an organization does – its mission, its values and how it defines itself.
2 Control systems. Processes in place to monitor performance and/or behaviour. Role
cul- tures have many formal controls, rules and procedures, for example.
3 Organizational structures. Reporting lines, hierarchies, work flows.
4 Power structures. Who makes the decisions, how widely spread is power and on what are power and influence based?
5 Symbols. Logos and designs, office allocation, car parking and other tangible and 302 What is organization culture?
intan- gible means of differentiating people. 303 What is organization culture?
6 Rituals and routines. Meetings, reports, budget and performance review processes.
7 Stories and myths. Convey messages about what is important and valued in an organization.
While not denying that organizations are cultural entities, it ought to be noted that the
underlying consequence of there being such cultural assumptions could be to stifle dis-
sent and limit innovation. In any event organizations are certainly only rarely capable of
being understood as a single, homogeneous culture. This brings with it the prospect of
cultural differentiation and adaptation via what would in effect be a process of evolution.
Evolutionary explanations of change attract some interest (see below). For the moment,
however, we need to note that the idea that a leadership team can change the culture of
an organization is very contentious. Parker (2000) observes that many of the ideas
behind organization culture theories are not new depending as they do on the well-known
ten- sions between cultural and structural or informal and formal explanations of behaviour in organizations.
With this in mind note that one of the often contending explanations for the fam-
ous Hawthorne research lies in a cultural explanation different to those offered by
Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson and others. You will recall that the Hawthorne
experiments started in consequence of an earlier study in the same factory looking at the
impact of light- ing on the productivity of workers engaged in tasks demanding physical
skills. Gains were observed as lighting levels were increased. Then lighting levels were
reduced. Even so fur- ther gains were recorded, only stemmed when lighting levels were
reduced to the level of moonlight. Social factors were believed to be the explanation. The
famous ‘relay assem- bly test room study’ was set up to investigate these factors in
greater depth. The results of this latter study were reported in great detail
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). Taken together, the results of this and later studies
at Hawthorne were taken as a demonstration that social factors explain performance
more fully than various economic explanations including the operation of incentive
schemes. These social factors were in-group factors such as ‘group pressure’. Thus the
social explanation did not relate to factors we might asso- ciate with corporate culture as such.
There have long been various contending explanations for these results (see Sofer (1973)
for an excellent summary). But Zinn (1980) offers an explanation of interest to those inter-
ested in cultural factors. The relay assembly test room operators were female workers in
the Hawthorne factory, a Western Electric factory in outer Chicago. The majority were
recent immigrants whose English language skills were relatively poor. They were often
the main income earner in their family. Economic pressure, mediated by the experience of
being a relatively recently arrived immigrant and therefore not fully socially adjusted, may
well offer an explanation as to why group pressure was so important. The group incentive
scheme was clearly an important part of the reasons for the group pressure so it is difficult to
conclude that no economic explanation applies. Certainly output increased in the relay
assembly test room. However, the Roethlisberger and Dickson book, although published in
1939, shows the data only to 1929. Whitehead (1936) publishes the relay assembly test
room data to 1934. From the advent of the Great Depression of 1929 output fell away
thus reinforcing the likelihood that while social factors were important there is the
possibility that these factors mediate the operation of a group incentive scheme, and that
from 1929 onwards the key motivation was that of limiting output. Note, however, that
other, operational factors may explain falling output from 1929 onwards. We cannot tell 303 What is organization culture?
from the available data but what we can conclude is that a combination of social, cultural
and economic explanations is needed. 304 What is organization culture?
We note here the intersection of various economic, social and contextual variables, as
well as social group factors related to the ‘informal’ organization idea. Of course, we have
long known that the ‘real world behaviour’ in an organization operates differently from the
formally proscribed rules, procedures and so on. In order to ‘get things done’ people develop
‘short cuts’. From there it is not difficult to see how corporate cultures may emerge. A
com- bination of the operation of formal systems and processes and informal organization
could reasonably be expected to result in the development of tacit understandings about
what is and is not ‘acceptable behaviour’ in any given organizational situation. The
important point to note here is the intersection of factors at different levels, individual,
organizational and contextual. If this is how culture arises we should also note the Deal
and Kennedy (1982) observation about ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ cultures.
A strong culture exists where employees respond to changing situations consistently
with their alignment to the values of the organization. There is a high degree of
predictability in this regard. Conversely, a weak culture exists where there is little
alignment with organizational values. Here control must be exercised through extensive
procedures, rules and formal sys- tems. Where the culture is strong we have the possibility,
identified by Janis (1972), of ‘group- think’. This happens when people do not challenge
current thinking but also where the group will take riskier decisions than would any
individual member acting alone. There is a strong belief in the organization’s values and a
tendency to create negative stereotypes of competi- tors, the latter leading to a belief in
the inherent advantages of the organization on the part of its members. In turn this leads
to the riskier decision making. It is worth noting that strong cultures tend to out-perform
weaker cultures (Kotter and Hesketh, 1992; Burt et al., 1994).
Are strong cultures likeliest to emerge in a period of growth? Is that when organizations
with strong cultures perform best? Could the Hawthorne research not be an example of a
strong culture in operation but one in which the contextual factors were both
conducive to the development of a strong culture and likely to support effective
performance due to the congruence between employee objectives and needs and corporate
goals. Does the very predictability of predictable performance limit the differentiation most
likely to help innov- ation and adaptability? I cannot provide final answers here but the
questions are intriguing to say the least. We turn now to various well-established models
of organizational culture before considering these questions more fully.
Models of organizational culture
Various influential models are identified, as follows. Hofstede
Hofstede (1968) identifies five characteristics of culture in his study of national, cultural influences:
● Power distance. The extent to which, in a given national context, people expect there
to be differences in the level of power across groups and between individuals. A high
power- distance score represents an expectation that some people can wield substantial
power. A low score is an expectation of equal influence over decisions. 305
Models of organizational culture ●
Uncertainty avoidance. In essence a national attitude to risk taking and coping with uncertainty. ●
Individualism vs collectivism. People are either concerned for themselves primarily or
act as a member of a group, subordinating individual to group goals. ●
Masculinity vs femininity. The contrast between male values of competitiveness,
aggres- sion and ambition with feminine values emphasizing the value of others and of
develop- mental rather than simply economic goals. ●
Long-term vs short-term orientation.
Using attitude data from a major multinational organization Hofstede was able to show
national differences on these factors. Deal and Kennedy
Deal and Kennedy (1982) defined organizational culture in a more pragmatic way,
which turns out not to be very helpful. They define it as ‘the way things get done around
here’. On the face of it this is based on organizational reality. However, it seems likely
that we can hardly explain why different organizations do things differently as being
definitive of the organization’s culture. The organizations concerned may deploy different
technology and therefore do things differently. Does that mean they had different cultures
at the outset? Of course, different cultures may emerge over time in those circumstances.
More helpfully, they go on to define measures of corporate culture depending on two factors: ●
Feedback. The speed of feedback and the scope of it have an impact on behaviour in an organization. ●
Risk. The level of uncertainty applying to an organization.
Using these factors Deal and Kennedy propose four culture types. In turn, these are
the ‘tough-guy’ or ‘macho’ culture in which rewards are high and feedback immediate.
Fast moving financial and investment companies might be typical but Deal and Kennedy
note that this culture can emerge in hospitals, sports organizations and police forces.
Next is the ‘work-hard/play-hard’ culture, emerging where risks are high but more typically
in large organizations as compared with the previous culture type.
Then they identify the ‘bet your company’ culture in which big decisions are taken but it
may be years before the results are known. Power utilities may be one sector in which
such a culture might emerge. Oil exploration may be another alongside aviation, space
and all forms of mining. Finally the ‘process’ culture is one in which people get little or no
feed- back. Often this is because services delivered to clients are complex with many
departments and individuals involved. Social services organizations are typical examples
but retail stores may be another.
The strength of this model is that it deals with corporate culture in a relatively
pragmatic way. The key problem is that if you are seeking to define culture types then the
types should be independent each of the other. Here the first three overlap substantially,
thus weakening the analytical power of the model. In practice it will be difficult to define
particular organi- zations using these culture types. However, the focus on feedback is
very useful, not least because it relates to discretion. 305
Models of organizational culture Handy
Handy (1984) builds on the work of Roger Harrison in developing a model of organiza-
tional culture in which he describes four culture types. First, the ‘power culture’ in
which power influence and decision taking is concentrated on a few key people and
positions. The organization is controlled from the top through networks and teams rather
like a web. Decision and action are quick and decisive and there are few formal systems,
procedures and rules. Next is the ‘role culture’. Here people as role incumbents or role
holders have clearly defined authority within previously defined parameters. Power
derives from position and/ or expertise, so long as the expertise is recognized and
legitimated organizationally. Third, a ‘person culture’ comprises an organizational setting
designed around individual perform- ance. A ballet or opera company would be one
example; law firms, consulting firms and the like are others. Handy suggests person
cultures exist where each individual ranks their own performance as superior to the
organization. Finally, a ‘task culture’ exists where teams are created to work on and
resolve particular problems. Power derives from expertise so long as that expertise is
needed. Organizations with matrix structures and multiple reporting lines will often be
characterized with this culture.
Here at least the culture types are defined independently of each other and linked to
a questionnaire Handy reproduces. However, there is a real problem in practice. The day
before writing this section I met with senior executives of a global technology services
group. It is organized into ‘sector groups’ to win and manage business, ‘capability groups’
to facilitate solutions development, central functions (including information services, mar-
keting, finance, human resources) to provide shared services, and a further ‘business
trans- formation group’ to provide thought leadership. It brings together teams to serve
clients. The key point is that it seeks to maintain a ‘task culture’ for clients alongside a
‘role culture’ elsewhere. Is organization reality too complex for these models to be the basis of useful solutions? The work of Ed Schein
Schein (1996) defines organizational culture as ‘the residue of success’. Of all organiza-
tional attributes it is the hardest to measure and therefore the most difficult to change.
Once changed, Schein argues that the impact of that change will be long lasting, outliving
prod- ucts and services, leaders and founders, buildings and other physical attributes.
Schein describes culture at three cognitive levels. The first and simplest are those aspects
of the organization which can be directly observed and experienced by anyone. The
second level deals with those aspects of culture professed by participants only. Here we
talk about mission statements and the like but also about employee and client surveys.
At the third level we deal with tacit assumptions, ‘unspoken rules’ and the like. Much
of this is taboo. It cannot be discussed openly in the organization. Schein suggests that
much of this exists without the conscious knowledge of those involved. This seems likely
only in the sense that we are talking about unspoken rules which are so deeply
embedded that we do not think about them.
Here Schein is offering a line of analysis also developed by Argyris and Schon (1978)
in their discussion of ‘espoused’ theory and ‘theory in use’. The latter distinction derives
from observing differences between what senior executives and others say is important
and what their behaviour actually signals to be important. Often in this sense behaviour in 306
Models of organizational culture
organizations is paradoxical. Thus it is that newcomers to an organization may take a
long time to settle into the culture. More important, it explains why culture change is so
difficult in practice. We shall see that writers working within the critical theory perspective
are also deeply sceptical about whether culture change can be achieved. Nevertheless,
recognizing the complexities ought not to allow us too easily to ignore the point that many
organizations certainly report successful culture change. Trompenaars
For Trompenaars (1998) each organization has its own unique culture, probably created
unconsciously, based on actions and behaviours of senior executives, founders and other
core people such as those who built it originally and any who subsequently changed it.
Culture is an acquired body of knowledge about how to behave and shared mind-sets,
and includes cognitive frameworks. His model utilizes the sources of national cultural
differ- ences in corporate culture on a number of dimensions: ●
Universalism vs pluralism. Do we focus on rules and procedures or rely on our relation-
ships when we seek to get things done? ●
Individualism vs communitarianism. Do we think organizations should focus attention on individuals or on groups? ●
Specific vs diffuse. Are relationships superficial and transactional or deep and go beyond the workplace? ●
Inner directed vs outer directed. Is action focused inside the organization or externally? ●
Achieved status vs ascribed status. Value is seen in who people are or in the position they hold. ●
Sequential time vs synchronic time. Attention to people and problems in sequence or jointly.
The connections between this study and the Hofstede work are evident enough but
it seems clear that Trompenaars’ work has application to corporate culture generally.
Thus, for example, where ascribed status is important in defining people’s worth in a
given organ- izational setting there have to be real questions about how easy it would
be to introduce change because change would be likely to undermine those definitions of
worth. While his concern was with the sources of national cultural difference it seems
clear that the model reveals much about corporate culture.
It is clear that attitudes to risk, the feedback people get and the timescales associated
with feedback are all important factors in understanding the emerging complexity to which
Schein also directs our attention. It is also probably true that we ought to examine the
mech- anisms through which cultures are formed because while these factors clearly are
important they can hardly be used to explain the emergence of long-lasting cultures. For
example, it would stretch incredulity to claim that the attitude to risk remains stable
over time, as between generations of employees, but we would need to believe that to be
true if we were to explain the emergence of a particular culture on that basis.
Both the ABF Ltd and International Engineering cases (see pages 186 and 150 respec-
tively) provide examples of this more detailed analysis. Particularly interesting is the point
about ‘fear of failure’; the pressures are dual in nature. On the one hand the short-term 307
Models of organizational culture
approach combined with a functional or departmental orientation, centralization and auto-
cratic management styles creates a powerful tendency to limit risk taking. On the
other, managers moving rapidly through careers and not having to face up to their
mistakes means they do not learn the interpersonal skills needed to do so. They find
facing up to perfor- mance issues difficult. Therefore, when forced to do so by those same
short-term pressures, they often do so inadequately and in a volatile, even primitive,
fashion (ABF Ltd). This fur- ther reduces risk taking, over time creating an organization
within which the ‘fear of fail- ure’ is very high indeed. Thus, where a problematic
culture emerges it may be difficult to change. Indeed it seems clear that to change
culture we must work on the mind-set or men- tal programming within the organization.
However, it does appear that we can do so. The key seems to be that of getting people to
focus on shared problems. Developing new solu- tions and supporting their successful
implementation helps. Most importantly we can aid the creation of new mind-sets by
identifying ‘tacit’ knowledge which already exists in the organization, converting it to
new explicit knowledge and encouraging its use in problem solving. Thus new
possibilities are created – engendering mind-set change not by seeking to destroy the
current mind-set but, rather, by adding new ideas; by focusing on solutions and not on failure. Goffee and Jones
Goffee and Jones (1996) offer another approach to the analysis of culture. For them
culture is about the presence (or absence) of community. Building on the ideas of social
theorists such as Durkheim they argue that sociability (the extent to which people like
each other, mix with each other in and out of work) and solidarity (the extent to which
there are shared goals) are important components of corporate culture. These two
dimensions lead to the identification of four cultures – see Figure 17.1.
Note that I have modified the Goffee and Jones model here. In my version, where
socia- bility is high but solidarity is low we have a team culture. Of course the solidarity
within the team may be high while solidarity for the organization as a whole is low. Where
sociability and solidarity are high we see a network culture emerging. These are
characterized by easy and effective vertical and horizontal communication and relate to
the value-added model described earlier in the text. Network Team (value added) Fragmented Mercenary High 308 Sociability