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Human activity is changing the biosphere in unprecedented ways, andaddressing this challenge will require changes in individual and community patterns of behavior. One approach to managing individual behaviors is “top-down” and involves imposing sanctions through legislative frameworks. However, of itself, a top-down framework does not appear sufficient to encourage the changes required to meet environmental sustainability targets. Thus, there has been interest in changing individual-leve. Tài liệu giúp bạn tham  khảo, ôn tập và đạt kết quả cao. Mời đọc đón xem!

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Frontiers in Environmental Science | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2021 | Volume 9 | Article 620125
Edited by:
José Castro-Sotomayor,
California State University,
Channel Islands, United States
Reviewed by:
Wilhelm Peekhaus,
University of WisconsinMilwaukee,
United States
Kate Maddalena,
University of Toronto Mississauga,
Canada
*Correspondence:
George L.W. Perry
george.perry@auckland.ac.nz
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Science and
Environmental Communication, a
section of the journal
Frontiers in Environmental Science
Received: 22 October 2020
Accepted: 30 April 2021
Published: 04 June 2021
Citation:
Perry GLW, Richardson SJ, Harré N,
Hodges D, Lyver PO’B, Maseyk FJF,
Taylor R, Todd JH, Tylianakis JM,
Yletyinen J and Brower A (2021)
Evaluating the Role of Social Norms in
Fostering ProEnvironmental
Behaviors. Front. Environ. Sci.
9:620125. doi:
10.3389/fenvs.2021.620125
Evaluating
the Role of
Social Norms
in
Fostering
Pro-
Environmental Behaviors
George L.W. Perry
1
*, Sarah J. Richardson
2
, Niki Harré
3
, Dave Hodges
4
, Phil OB. Lyver
2
, Fleur J.F.
Maseyk
5
, Riki Taylor
1
, Jacqui H. Todd
6
, Jason M. Tylianakis
7
, Johanna Yletyinen
2,7
and Ann Brower
8
1
School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand,
2
Manaaki WhenuaLandcare Research, Lincoln,
New Zealand,
3
School of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand,
4
DairyNZ, Hamilton, New Zealand,
5
The
Catalyst Group, Wellington, New Zealand,
6
The New Zealand Institute for Plant and Food Research Limited, Auckland,
New Zealand,
7
School of Biological Sciences, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand,
8
School of Earth and
Environment, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
Human activity is changing the biosphere in unprecedented ways, and addressing this
challenge will require changes in individual and community patterns of behavior. One
approach to managing individual behaviors is “top-down” and involves imposing sanctions
through legislative frameworks. However, of itself, a top-down framework does not appear
sufficient to encourage the changes required to meet environmental sustainability targets.
Thus, there has been interest in changing individual-level behavior from the “bottom-up” by,
for example, fostering desirable proenvironmental behaviors via social norms. Social norms
arise from expectations about how others will behave and the consequences of conforming
to or departing from them. Meta-analyses suggest that social norms can promote pro-
environmental behavior. Environmental social norms that appear to have changed in recent
decades and have themselves promoted change include recycling, include nascent behavioral
shifts such as the move away from single-use plastics and flight shaming (flygskam). However,
whether the conditions under which pro-environmental social norms emerge and are
adhered to align with environmental systems’ features is unclear. Furthermore, individuals
might feel powerless in a global system, which can limit the growth and influence of pro-
environmental norms. We review the conditions believed to promote the development of
and adherence to social norms, then consider how those conditions relate to the
environmental challenges of the Anthropocene. While promoting social norms has a valuable
role in promoting pro-environmental actions, we conclude that norms are most likely to be
effective where individual actions are immediately evident and have an obvious and local
effect.
Keywords: pro-environmental behavior, social norms, uncertainty, collective action, psychological distance
The ongoing process of environmental degradation is thus deeply rooted in multiple
large-scale collective action dilemmas, in which individual rationality is pitted against
collective goods on regional, national or even global scales.Duit (2010, p. 900).
INTRODUCTION
Environmental degradation and biodiversity loss are among the most urgent challenges facing
humanity (Ripple et al., 2017; Díaz et al., 2019). Business as usual offers little hope of meeting
environmental policy targets. Scientists are urged to contribute solutions matching the complexity
of the social-ecological issues in question (Rands et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013) and to move
PERSPECTIV
E
published:
04
June
2021
doi:
10.3389
2021.62012
5
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Perry et al. Social Norms and Pro-Environmental Behaviors
Frontiers in Environmental Science | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2021 | Volume 9 | Article 620125
beyond the loading dock
approach of delivering
science to the public and
hoping it will be used (Enquist
et al., 2017). Integrating
social and environmental
sciences is essential if
biophysical evidence is to be
used to inform the
development of pro-
environmental behaviors by
society, industry and
government; however, the
scales and contexts in which
different pro-environmental
behaviors will work are
unresolved (Ostrom, 2000;
Oullier, 2013). Solving
environmental problems
often requires individuals to
cooperate for a common
good or goal. These actions,
however, sit alongside
individual-level conflicts with
the group outcome and
concerns of inequality where
there are benefits for free-
riders (Hardin, 1968; Duit,
2010), or disparities across
individuals (or sub-groups) in
the costs of taking the same
action. Importantly too,
people bring their
membership of social groups
to collective problems, which
may include a history of
conflict that can reduce
peoples willingness to work
toward a common goal
(Bernhard et al., 2006).
Recent high-profile
publications (Nyborg et al.,
2016; Bodin, 2017; Byerly et
al., 2018; Centola et al., 2018;
Otto et al., 2020) have
explored how fostering social
norms may initiate and
maintain desirable
environmental behaviors.
Here, we consider the extent
to which social norms can
contribute to solving large-
scale ecological problems. We
briefly review the properties
of social norms and the
conditions under which they are generated and maintained. Then, we summarize how the
properties of environmental systems challenge the establishment of pro-environmental social
norms. A vast literature exists on achieving behavioral changesocial psychology, cognitive
science, behavioral economics, regulatory research, and law to name a few. We do not aim to
extensively review this material (for reviews see Gifford, 2011; Young, 2015; Fehr and
Schurtenberger, 2018; Nyborg, 2018). Instead, drawing on the literature, we highlight potential
misalignments between norm-fostering conditions and environmental systems, while outlining
the contexts where social norms might foster proenvironmental behavior.
WHAT ARE SOCIAL NORMS?
Definitions of social norms vary across disciplines (Nyborg, 2018). However, most agree that they
are standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs as to how individual group
members ought to behave in a given situation(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, p. 185). Social norms
take many forms, including recurrent patterns of behavior and formalized rule-sets (Morris et al.,
2015). Bicchieri (2017) argues that subjective social norms, (i.e. the perceived social pressure to
participate or not in a behavior) have two components: an empirical expectation about how others
do behave and a shared belief in how others should behave (Figure 1); we focus on the former.
Social norms underpin social cohesion (Bernhard et al., 2006). At the individual level, social
norms emerge from a combination of imitation as a primary form of learning, our desire to belong
to a social group that approves of our behavior, and the mostly predictable response by an
individual to group approval or disapproval (Harré, 2018). Why do groups of individuals adhere to
social norms? Among the many explanations proposed, Morris et al. (2015) identify three reasons:
1) the repeated expression of personal beliefs; 2) the desire for social acceptance and cohesion;
and 3) rational decisions about interactions.
Gifford (2011) considered perceived social disapproval to be a potential barrier to adopting pro-
environmental behaviors ( they consider climate change). While it may be more palatable to focus
on rewarding good behaviors,sanctioning inappropriate behaviorsis vital for the persistence
and maintenance of norms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018). The
asymmetries between peoples willingness to approve of pro-environmental behavior but
unwillingness to disapprove of environmentally damaging behavior may inhibit changes to social
norms. Therefore, these asymmetries can create an internal conflict between the desire for action
vs. the desire for social acceptance (Clayton et al., 2013). A rational choice model suggests that the
benefits of social inclusion should match the cost of adopting a new norm, (e.g. the cost of
changing a behavior plus the cost of applying altruistic punishment to others; Ostrom, 2000). Kinzig
et al. (2013, p. 171) argue that cooperative strategies for collective action problems are most likely
... with repeated interactions in smaller, more homogeneous communities ... that use punishment
and communication to enforce norms. In short, cooperation is most likely where individuals have
a strong awareness of each others behavior.
ALIGNMENT BETWEEN SOCIAL NORMS AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
To evaluate whether conditions fostering pro-environmental social norms align with the features
of environmental systems, we start by outlining the key conditions that determine when social
norms emerge or change, drawing on the broad reasons for adherence to social norms identified
by Morris et al. (2015). Recalling that our enquiry focuses on the domain of expectations about
how people do behave instead of shared beliefs about how they should behave, our review of the
literature has a decidedly behavioral flavormeaning we focus on decisions more than values
themselves.
Certainty
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Perry et al. Social Norms and Pro-Environmental Behaviors
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Hine and Gifford. (1996)
describe two uncertainties
relevant to environmental
decision-making: social (what
will others do?) and
contextual (in what setting
am I making the decision?).
Humans prefer to make
decisions and act in contexts
where the risks are known
(ambiguity aversion)
(Ellsberg, 1961), and
uncertainty lowers the
adoption of pro-
environmental actions
(Milfont, 2010; Gifford, 2011;
Barrett and Dannenberg,
2013). As uncertainty
increases, so does
psychological distance, (i.e.
the cognitive distance
between oneself and others
or events), making desirable
behaviors less likely. In short,
humans are much less likely
to act if it is unclear that we
really need to.
Tangibility and
Immediacy of Rewards
Ambiguous, diffuse, or future
benefits all undermine the
likelihood of adopting a
behavior (the
intergenerational tragedy of
the commons; Hauser et al., 2014) as they increase psychological distance. Conversely, vague,
ambiguous, or distant rewards might widen the gap between values and actions, (e.g. I know I
should walk to work, but driving is so much quicker and easier.) (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002).
Context
Social norms are tied to locations and the people who inhabit them, (e.g. immediate environment,
national identity, cultural identity); in short, social norms are place-bound and contextdependent.
Therefore, fostering and promoting social norms usually necessitates localized, bottom-up
approaches. Repeated interactions with or within a group are essential to establish rules, form a
social contract, copy behaviors, receive approval, and experience disapproval. Social norms are
difficult to foster between strangers and where knowledge of the likely behaviors of those being
interacted with is limited (Duffy et al., 2013). This outcome is essential for pro-environmental
social norms because, at large scales, individual or group decisions may be effectively anonymous.
Fairness
Fairness is a core tenet of human moral reasoning (Harré, 2018) and fosters participation by
creating equality, providing clarity around reward and sanction, and encouraging widespread
buyin. For example, Gowdy (2008) illustrates how conceptions of fairness are central to developing
climate change policy. Equally, aversion to inequity can foster pro-social behavior by promoting
actions perceived as increasing equity (Midler et al., 2015). However, a fundamental difficulty is
that this judgment of fairness requires us to compare an action today, with an action in the future;
such present-future comparisons are difficult, especially if we perceive a risk of others cheating
(Hauser et al., 2014).
Signaling/Visibility of Activities
Signaling is an essential component of social norms (Griskevicius et al., 2010). As Young (2015)
notes, the importance of a signaling behavior might not be the action itself, but its reputational
value. Thus, the visibility of an action or behavior is likely an important component of social norms
(Nyborg et al., 2016). While some environmental behaviors are visible, (e.g. recycling), others are
not, (e.g. the decision not to travel), which makes them challenging to foster as norms; many
potentially desirable pro-environmental behaviors will involve the latter.
SOCIAL NORMS IN THE FACE OF
FIGURE
1
|
A
decision
tree
to
evaluate
what
sort
of
norm
an
observed
behavior
relates
to;
adapted
from
Biccheri.
(2017)
.
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UNCERTAINTY AND
COMPLEX DYNAMICS
The complexity of ecological
systems is a dominant theme
of environmental research
and management
(Christensen et al., 1996).
This complexity challenges
behavioral change because
humans struggle to
conceptualize and predict the
dynamics ofeven the simplest
systems where feedbacks are
at play (Sterman, 1994; Figure
2). Amplifying this problem is
that complex or open systems
can exhibit equifinality, in
which the same behaviors
result in contrasting
outcomes, or different
behaviors result in the same
outcome. Such dynamics
make it challenging to
forecast system responses to
behavioral change, or even
distinguish cause from effect.
Forrester (1971) argues that
humans often assume that
cause and effect are local
system properties and tend
to underestimate linkages that are more distant in time or space. Such perceptual challenges arise
in engineered systems, and are more acute for environmental problems, (e.g. ocean acidification)
where there are weak, spatio-temporally disjointed, shared (and often disowned) positions of
responsibility (see also Pawlik, 1991; Rands et al., 2010). Uncertainty can arise in decision-making
about proenvironmental behaviors as humans may receive deliberately confused messages, (i.e.
misinformation) about the benefits and outcomes of their environmental behaviors (Bavel et al.,
2020). These characteristics all act to increase psychological distance. In short, in this context it is
extremely difficult for an individual or group to estimate the outcomes, or costs and benefits, of a
given environmental action. This difficulty suggests that the psychological mechanism that might
embed individual pro-environmental behaviors as collective social norms is indirect at best
(Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002).
Linking individual behaviors to ecological impacts is further obstructed by difficulties in
quantifying environmental change and impacts, especially given that an actions social reward
might not mirror its environmental benefit. Quantifying environmental condition and performance
is complex and widely debated. There is an extensive technical discussion regarding the merits of
a vast array of environmental metrics and indicators (OBrien et al., 2016; Hillebrand et al., 2018).
In the context of social norms, the question is whether these metrics provide an appropriate way
to measure the outcomes of an individuals actions. The answer is, of course, it depends.
Some components of ecological systems can be described with metrics, (e.g. physico-chemical
measures) and appropriate environmental limits put in place, (e.g. relating to public health
outcomes), even if this process can become worryingly politicized (Joy and Canning, 2020). For
other facets of ecosystems, such as biodiversity, metrics are contextdependent, (e.g. increase in
species richness is not uniformly positive) and tenuously linked to system condition, (e.g. weed
and pest species impacts are wide-ranging; Mack et al., 2000). Even if biodiversity can be
measured, the numbers are not value-free (Stone, 2002). For example, individual and group
perception of a speciesvalue is often biased toward charismatic taxa, (e.g. pandas vs nematodes;
Colléony et al., 2017).
One proposed solution that attempts to bridge the gap between social norms and metrics to
measure ecological systems is to recognize and place economic and cultural value on the
ecosystem servicesand benefits that arise from ecological entities and functions (Daily, 1997).
Some argue that applying an ecosystem services approach can help foster pro-environmental
FIGURE
2
|
A
schematic
overview
of
knowledge-action
loops
adapted
fro
m
Sterman.
(1994)
showing
(
A
)
a
simple
model
of
decision-information
fl
ow
and
(
B
)
examples
of
the
individual
and
group-level
uncertainties
a
nd
behaviors
that
in
fl
uence
knowledge
uptake
and
behavioral
change
(
points
below
t
he
bolded
text).
These
multi-level
uncertainties
and
behaviors
in
fl
uence
the
conditions
under
which
social
norms
can
be
fostere
d
by
in
fl
uencing
individual
decisions
and
hence
social
approval
and
sanctioning.
These
uncertainties
are
variously
irreducible,
reducible
and
exploitable.
Figure
adapted
wth
permission
from
John
Wiley
and
Sons.
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behavior as the need to
sustainably manage
resources will become more
apparent when the
contribution of natural capital
to the production of goods
and services (including
cultural and social values)
from the environment is
accounted for. The actual cost
of producing goods from the
environment needs to be
tallied rather than
externalized (c.f. subsidizing
profit by under-pricing, and
over-extracting, natural
resources); such cost
accounting might increase
fairness, (e.g. the costs of soil
erosion and water quality
would be included in food
pricing). If the internalizing of
environmental costs drove
behavioral change, this
change might embed itself as
a social norm, reinforcing the
behavior itself.
The complexity of
environmental systems
causes three challenges for
behavioral change because it
is difficult for an individual to
discern: 1) whether a given
action (which carries some
cost) will have the desired
environmental effect; 2)
whether there will be an
associated social reward; and
3) the magnitude of that
reward. The combination of
these three factors risks
making the individual feel
powerless in the face of a
large and amorphous
problem like climate change.
Powerlessness (or lack of
selfefficacy) makes it easier
for an individual to justify
deciding against pro-
environmental behavior
despite strong
proenvironmental values.
IS THERE A PLACE FOR SOCIAL NORMS IN ENHANCING PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL
BEHAVIOUR; AND IF SO, WHAT IS IT?
Yes, but it is limited and concentrated in the realm of norms we focus on in this paperexpectations
about how people do behave, not beliefs about how they should. As such, social norms have a
place in decisions about individual behavior, and it is on this decision-making that we focus.
Griskevicius et al. (2010) identify two models of motivation for environmental behavior:
environmental concern and rational economics. The first emphasizes that the decision to act in a
pro-environmental manner arises from some inherent concern for the environment. In contrast,
the second suggests proenvironmental actions are based on economic maximization. Ultimately,
this spectrum perhaps reduces to the question of the role of intrinsic (concern for the environment
per se) vs. extrinsic, (e.g. material) motivations in adopting particular behaviors (Bénabou and
Tirole, 2003).
Social norms arise from a need for personal approval, a propensity to imitation, and
sanctioning; hence they are, to some degree, internally motivated. In terms of promoting
persistent behaviors, this difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation matters for two
reasons. First, there is a body of psychological evidence suggesting that the use of extrinsic
incentives may detract from intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) and,
more specifically, social norms (Pellerano et al., 2017). At best, we might expect that extrinsically
motivated social norms are less intense and less likely to endure than more intrinsically motivated
ones. Second, given that social expectations underpin social norms, norms themselves are
dynamic (Bicchieri, 2017).
We argue that the nature of environmental systems makes it difficult for individuals to estimate
the costs and benefits of specific decisions, which is an essential component of rational choice
models. Ecosystem service frameworks have a role to play by helping individuals understand the
value (monetary or otherwise) of ecosystems (Daily et al., 2000). Furthermore, there is theoretical
and empirical evidence that social norms play an important role in cooperative decision making
about the environment. For example, Byerly et al. (2018) suggest that nudging(or making good
behavior easier, using positive reinforcement, and making indirect suggestions) can motivate pro-
environmental behaviors around energy use, recycling and other actions (Thaler and Sunstein,
2009). In many cases, these are settings where there is a direct benefit to the participant, and the
norms tend to be approval-based.
Given that engrained social norms do support proenvironmental behaviors (Farrow et al., 2017;
Byerly et al., 2018), an obvious question is how and where to try to use them for environmental or
social benefit. According to Clayton et al. (2013), such efforts require identifying desired behaviors
and their determinants. We argue that social norms are likely to be most useful for local-scale
problems and where there are immediate and tangible rewards. Care must also be taken to avoid
perverse and unanticipated outcomes. For example, Schultz et al. (2007) demonstrate that
providing normative information influences behaviors on either side of the norm. In particular,
they highlight the risk of boomerang effects where individuals are released from fear of
sanctioning (they describe this outcome when discussing alcohol consumption, when those who
discover that they consume less than the norm may feel permitted to increase their consumption).
Likewise, efforts to foster social norms must acknowledge their interdependent and multi-level
nature; that is, approval and sanctioning occur at multiple social levels from the individual to the
community (Bicchieri, 2017).
Ultimately, environmental issues require multiple solutions (Otto et al., 2020). Social norms do
contribute to the maintenance and change of behavior; however, as we have argued, the potential
for using norms to change behavior is likely restricted to specific problems where the rewards of
certain behaviors are tangible and outweigh the benefits of not doing it. Many of our
environmental issues are spatially diffuse and play out over extended time-frames, which
increases our psychological distance from them. In such settings, norms may be less effective. One
solution is to reframe what are perceived as global and diffuse issues as local problems that
individuals can help to solve; this is not a new idea, it is the essence of the think global, act local
approach.
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CONCLUSION
If policymakers seek to
engineer new, or foster
existing, proenvironmental
social norms, careful
consideration must be given
to assessing norms
effectiveness in specific
contexts ( social, cultural and
ecological). Unfortunately,
empirical demonstration of
the success of social norms is
often lacking, in part because
behavioral changes are
typically engineered through
a mixed-policy response
(including regulatory and
non-regulatory responses,
education, and financial
incentives); and government
agencies rarely analyze how
these policy responses
interact. Thus the singular effect of norms is near impossible to assess. Such understanding could
improve norms influence on behavior. Identifying the characteristics of pro-environmental
behavioral initiatives that stick, compared to those that ultimately fail, would be a valuable step.
A stronger focus on the robust evaluation of the contribution of social norms to pro-environmental
behaviors and decision-making could guide the development and success of more enduring
proenvironmental initiatives.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/Supplementary
Material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
This perspective results from a workshop that all authors attended and contributed substantially
to. GP and SR led writing of the manuscript and all co-authors contributed materially to writing
and revision of drafts.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge funding from the Biological Heritage National Science Challenge (Project 3.1)
administered by the New Zealand Ministry for Business, Innovation and the Environment.
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Conflict of Interest: Author DH was employed by company DairyNZ. Author FM
was employed by company The Catalyst Group.
The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2021 Perry, Richardson, Harré, Hodges, Lyver, Maseyk, Taylor, Todd,
Tylianakis, Yletyinen and Brower. This is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
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lOMoAR cPSD| 32573545 Environmental Behaviors Edited by: José Castro-Sotomayor,
George L.W. Perry1*, Sarah J. Richardson2, Niki Harré3, Dave Hodges4, Phil O’B. Lyver2, Fleur J.F. California State University,
Maseyk5, Riki Taylor1, Jacqui H. Todd6, Jason M. Tylianakis7, Johanna Yletyinen2,7 and Ann Brower8
Channel Islands, United States
1School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, 2Manaaki Whenua—Landcare Research, Lincoln, Reviewed by:
New Zealand, 3School of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, 4DairyNZ, Hamilton, New Zealand, 5The Wilhelm Peekhaus,
Catalyst Group, Wellington, New Zealand, 6The New Zealand Institute for Plant and Food Research Limited, Auckland,
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee,
New Zealand, 7School of Biological Sciences, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8School of Earth and United States
Environment, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand Kate Maddalena,
University of Toronto Mississauga, Canada
Human activity is changing the biosphere in unprecedented ways, and addressing this *Correspondence:
challenge will require changes in individual and community patterns of behavior. One George L.W. Perry
approach to managing individual behaviors is “top-down” and involves imposing sanctions george.perry@auckland.ac.nz
through legislative frameworks. However, of itself, a top-down framework does not appear Specialty section:
sufficient to encourage the changes required to meet environmental sustainability targets. This article was submitted to
Thus, there has been interest in changing individual-level behavior from the “bottom-up” by, Science and
for example, fostering desirable proenvironmental behaviors via social norms. Social norms PERSPECTIV E published: 04 June 2021
doi: 10.3389 /fenvs. 2021.62012 5
Environmental Communication, a
arise from expectations about how others will behave and the consequences of conforming section of the journal
to or departing from them. Meta-analyses suggest that social norms can promote pro-
Frontiers in Environmental Science
environmental behavior. Environmental social norms that appear to have changed in recent Received: 22 October 2020 Accepted: 30 April 2021
decades and have themselves promoted change include recycling, include nascent behavioral Published: 04 June 2021
shifts such as the move away from single-use plastics and flight shaming (flygskam). However, Citation:
whether the conditions under which pro-environmental social norms emerge and are
Perry GLW, Richardson SJ, Harré N,
adhered to align with environmental systems’ features is unclear. Furthermore, individuals
Hodges D, Lyver PO’B, Maseyk FJF,
might feel powerless in a global system, which can limit the growth and influence of pro-
Taylor R, Todd JH, Tylianakis JM,
Yletyinen J and Brower A (2021)
environmental norms. We review the conditions believed to promote the development of
Evaluating the Role of Social Norms in
and adherence to social norms, then consider how those conditions relate to the Fostering ProEnvironmental
environmental challenges of the Anthropocene. While promoting social norms has a valuable
Behaviors. Front. Environ. Sci. 9:620125. doi:
role in promoting pro-environmental actions, we conclude that norms are most likely to be 10.3389/fenvs.2021.620125
effective where individual actions are immediately evident and have an obvious and local Evaluating effect. the Role of
Keywords: pro-environmental behavior, social norms, uncertainty, collective action, psychological distance
“The ongoing process of environmental degradation is thus deeply rooted in multiple Social Norms
large-scale collective action dilemmas, in which individual rationality is pitted against
collective goods on regional, national or even global scales.” Duit (2010, p. 900). in Fostering INTRODUCTION Pro-
Environmental degradation and biodiversity loss are among the most urgent challenges facing
humanity (Ripple et al., 2017; Díaz et al., 2019). Business as usual offers little hope of meeting
environmental policy targets. Scientists are urged to contribute solutions matching the complexity
of the social-ecological issues in question (Rands et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013) and to move
Frontiers in Environmental Science | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2021 | Volume 9 | Article 620125 lOMoAR cPSD| 32573545
Perry et al. Social Norms and Pro-Environmental Behaviors beyond the “loading dock
conditions under which they are generated and maintained. Then, we summarize how the approach” of delivering
properties of environmental systems challenge the establishment of pro-environmental social science to the public and
norms. A vast literature exists on achieving behavioral change–social psychology, cognitive
hoping it will be used (Enquist
science, behavioral economics, regulatory research, and law to name a few. We do not aim to et al., 2017). Integrating
extensively review this material (for reviews see Gifford, 2011; Young, 2015; Fehr and social and environmental
Schurtenberger, 2018; Nyborg, 2018). Instead, drawing on the literature, we highlight potential sciences is essential if
misalignments between norm-fostering conditions and environmental systems, while outlining biophysical evidence is to be
the contexts where social norms might foster proenvironmental behavior. used to inform the development of pro- environmental behaviors by WHAT ARE SOCIAL NORMS? society, industry and government; however, the
Definitions of social norms vary across disciplines (Nyborg, 2018). However, most agree that they scales and contexts in which
are “standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs as to how individual group different pro-environmental
members ought to behave in a given situation” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, p. 185). Social norms behaviors will work are
take many forms, including recurrent patterns of behavior and formalized rule-sets (Morris et al., unresolved (Ostrom, 2000;
2015). Bicchieri (2017) argues that subjective social norms, (i.e. the perceived social pressure to Oullier, 2013). Solving
participate or not in a behavior) have two components: an empirical expectation about how others environmental problems
do behave and a shared belief in how others should behave (Figure 1); we focus on the former. often requires individuals to
Social norms underpin social cohesion (Bernhard et al., 2006). At the individual level, social cooperate for a common
norms emerge from a combination of imitation as a primary form of learning, our desire to belong good or goal. These actions,
to a social group that approves of our behavior, and the mostly predictable response by an however, sit alongside
individual to group approval or disapproval (Harré, 2018). Why do groups of individuals adhere to
individual-level conflicts with
social norms? Among the many explanations proposed, Morris et al. (2015) identify three reasons: the group outcome and
1) the repeated expression of personal beliefs; 2) the desire for social acceptance and cohesion; concerns of inequality where
and 3) rational decisions about interactions. there are benefits for free-
Gifford (2011) considered perceived social disapproval to be a potential barrier to adopting pro- riders (Hardin, 1968; Duit,
environmental behaviors ( they consider climate change). While it may be more palatable to focus 2010), or disparities across
on rewarding “good behaviors,” sanctioning “inappropriate behaviors” is vital for the persistence
individuals (or sub-groups) in
and maintenance of norms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018). The the costs of taking the same
asymmetries between people’s willingness to approve of pro-environmental behavior but action. Importantly too,
unwillingness to disapprove of environmentally damaging behavior may inhibit changes to social people bring their
norms. Therefore, these asymmetries can create an internal conflict between the desire for action membership of social groups
vs. the desire for social acceptance (Clayton et al., 2013). A rational choice model suggests that the to collective problems, which
benefits of social inclusion should match the cost of adopting a new norm, (e.g. the cost of may include a history of
changing a behavior plus the cost of applying altruistic punishment to others; Ostrom, 2000). Kinzig conflict that can reduce
et al. (2013, p. 171) argue that cooperative strategies for collective action problems are most likely
people’s willingness to work
“... with repeated interactions in smaller, more homogeneous communities ... that use punishment toward a common goal
and communication to enforce norms”. In short, cooperation is most likely where individuals have (Bernhard et al., 2006).
a strong awareness of each other’s behavior. Recent high-profile publications (Nyborg et al., 2016; Bodin, 2017; Byerly et
ALIGNMENT BETWEEN SOCIAL NORMS AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
al., 2018; Centola et al., 2018; Otto et al., 2020) have
To evaluate whether conditions fostering pro-environmental social norms align with the features explored how fostering social
of environmental systems, we start by outlining the key conditions that determine when social norms may initiate and
norms emerge or change, drawing on the broad reasons for adherence to social norms identified maintain desirable
by Morris et al. (2015). Recalling that our enquiry focuses on the domain of expectations about environmental behaviors.
how people do behave instead of shared beliefs about how they should behave, our review of the Here, we consider the extent
literature has a decidedly behavioral flavor–meaning we focus on decisions more than values to which social norms can themselves. contribute to solving large- Certainty scale ecological problems. We briefly review the properties of social norms and the
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Perry et al. Social Norms and Pro-Environmental Behaviors
FIGURE 1 | A decision tree to evaluate what sort of norm an observed behavior relates to; adapted from Biccheri. (2017) . Hine and Gifford. (1996)
the commons; Hauser et al., 2014) as they increase psychological distance. Conversely, vague, describe two uncertainties
ambiguous, or distant rewards might widen the gap between values and actions, (e.g. “I know I relevant to environmental
should walk to work, but driving is so much quicker and easier.”) (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). decision-making: social (what will others do?) and Context contextual (in what setting
Social norms are tied to locations and the people who inhabit them, (e.g. immediate environment, am I making the decision?).
national identity, cultural identity); in short, social norms are place-bound and contextdependent. Humans prefer to make
Therefore, fostering and promoting social norms usually necessitates localized, bottom-up decisions and act in contexts
approaches. Repeated interactions with or within a group are essential to establish rules, form a where the risks are known
social contract, copy behaviors, receive approval, and experience disapproval. Social norms are (ambiguity aversion)
difficult to foster between strangers and where knowledge of the likely behaviors of those being (Ellsberg, 1961), and
interacted with is limited (Duffy et al., 2013). This outcome is essential for pro-environmental uncertainty lowers the
social norms because, at large scales, individual or group decisions may be effectively anonymous. adoption of pro- environmental actions Fairness
(Milfont, 2010; Gifford, 2011;
Fairness is a core tenet of human moral reasoning (Harré, 2018) and fosters participation by Barrett and Dannenberg,
creating equality, providing clarity around reward and sanction, and encouraging widespread 2013). As uncertainty
buyin. For example, Gowdy (2008) illustrates how conceptions of fairness are central to developing increases, so does
climate change policy. Equally, aversion to inequity can foster pro-social behavior by promoting psychological distance, (i.e.
actions perceived as increasing equity (Midler et al., 2015). However, a fundamental difficulty is the cognitive distance
that this judgment of fairness requires us to compare an action today, with an action in the future; between oneself and others
such present-future comparisons are difficult, especially if we perceive a risk of others cheating or events), making desirable (Hauser et al., 2014).
behaviors less likely. In short, humans are much less likely
Signaling/Visibility of Activities
to act if it is unclear that we
Signaling is an essential component of social norms (Griskevicius et al., 2010). As Young (2015) really need to.
notes, the importance of a signaling behavior might not be the action itself, but its reputational Tangibility and
value. Thus, the visibility of an action or behavior is likely an important component of social norms
(Nyborg et al., 2016). While some environmental behaviors are visible, (e.g. recycling), others are Immediacy of Rewards
not, (e.g. the decision not to travel), which makes them challenging to foster as norms; many Ambiguous, diffuse, or future
potentially desirable pro-environmental behaviors will involve the latter. benefits all undermine the likelihood of adopting a behavior (the SOCIAL NORMS IN THE FACE OF intergenerational tragedy of
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Perry et al. Social Norms and Pro-Environmental Behaviors UNCERTAINTY AND
to underestimate linkages that are more distant in time or space. Such perceptual challenges arise COMPLEX DYNAMICS
in engineered systems, and are more acute for environmental problems, (e.g. ocean acidification)
where there are weak, spatio-temporally disjointed, shared (and often disowned) positions of The complexity of ecological
responsibility (see also Pawlik, 1991; Rands et al., 2010). Uncertainty can arise in decision-making systems is a dominant theme
about proenvironmental behaviors as humans may receive deliberately confused messages, (i.e.
FIGURE 2 | A schematic overview of knowledge-action loops adapted fro m Sterman. (1994) showing ( A ) a simple model of decision-information fl ow and ( B )
examples of the individual and group-level uncertainties a nd behaviors that in fl uence knowledge uptake and behavioral change ( points below t he bolded text). These
multi-level uncertainties and behaviors in fl uence the conditions under which social norms can be fostere d by in fl uencing individual decisions and hence social approval
and sanctioning. These uncertainties are variously irreducible, reducible and exploitable. Figure adapted wth permission from John Wiley and Sons. of environmental research
misinformation) about the benefits and outcomes of their environmental behaviors (Bavel et al., and management
2020). These characteristics all act to increase psychological distance. In short, in this context it is (Christensen et al., 1996).
extremely difficult for an individual or group to estimate the outcomes, or costs and benefits, of a This complexity challenges
given environmental action. This difficulty suggests that the psychological mechanism that might behavioral change because
embed individual pro-environmental behaviors as collective social norms is indirect at best humans struggle to (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). conceptualize and predict the
Linking individual behaviors to ecological impacts is further obstructed by difficulties in dynamics ofeven the simplest
quantifying environmental change and impacts, especially given that an action’s social reward systems where feedbacks are
might not mirror its environmental benefit. Quantifying environmental condition and performance
at play (Sterman, 1994; Figure
is complex and widely debated. There is an extensive technical discussion regarding the merits of
2). Amplifying this problem is
a vast array of environmental metrics and indicators (O’Brien et al., 2016; Hillebrand et al., 2018). that complex or open systems
In the context of social norms, the question is whether these metrics provide an appropriate way
can exhibit “equifinality,” in
to measure the outcomes of an individual’s actions. The answer is, of course, “it depends.” which the same behaviors
Some components of ecological systems can be described with metrics, (e.g. physico-chemical result in contrasting
measures) and appropriate environmental limits put in place, (e.g. relating to public health outcomes, or different
outcomes), even if this process can become worryingly politicized (Joy and Canning, 2020). For behaviors result in the same
other facets of ecosystems, such as biodiversity, metrics are contextdependent, (e.g. increase in outcome. Such dynamics
species richness is not uniformly positive) and tenuously linked to system condition, (e.g. weed make it challenging to
and pest species’ impacts are wide-ranging; Mack et al., 2000). Even if biodiversity can be forecast system responses to
measured, the numbers are not value-free (Stone, 2002). For example, individual and group behavioral change, or even
perception of a species’ value is often biased toward charismatic taxa, (e.g. pandas vs nematodes;
distinguish cause from effect. Colléony et al., 2017). Forrester (1971) argues that
One proposed solution that attempts to bridge the gap between social norms and metrics to humans often assume that
measure ecological systems is to recognize and place economic and cultural value on the cause and effect are local
“ecosystem services” and benefits that arise from ecological entities and functions (Daily, 1997). system properties and tend
Some argue that applying an ecosystem services approach can help foster pro-environmental
Frontiers in Environmental Science | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2021 | Volume 9 | Article 620125 lOMoAR cPSD| 32573545
Perry et al. Social Norms and Pro-Environmental Behaviors behavior as the need to
IS THERE A PLACE FOR SOCIAL NORMS IN ENHANCING PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL sustainably manage
BEHAVIOUR; AND IF SO, WHAT IS IT? resources will become more apparent when the
Yes, but it is limited and concentrated in the realm of norms we focus on in this paper–expectations
contribution of natural capital
about how people do behave, not beliefs about how they should. As such, social norms have a to the production of goods
place in decisions about individual behavior, and it is on this decision-making that we focus. and services (including
Griskevicius et al. (2010) identify two models of motivation for environmental behavior: cultural and social values)
environmental concern and rational economics. The first emphasizes that the decision to act in a from the environment is
pro-environmental manner arises from some inherent concern for the environment. In contrast,
accounted for. The actual cost
the second suggests proenvironmental actions are based on economic maximization. Ultimately, of producing goods from the
this spectrum perhaps reduces to the question of the role of intrinsic (concern for the environment environment needs to be
per se) vs. extrinsic, (e.g. material) motivations in adopting particular behaviors (Bénabou and tallied rather than Tirole, 2003).
externalized (c.f. subsidizing
Social norms arise from a need for personal approval, a propensity to imitation, and profit by under-pricing, and
sanctioning; hence they are, to some degree, internally motivated. In terms of promoting over-extracting, natural
persistent behaviors, this difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation matters for two resources); such cost
reasons. First, there is a body of psychological evidence suggesting that the use of extrinsic accounting might increase
incentives may detract from intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) and,
fairness, (e.g. the costs of soil
more specifically, social norms (Pellerano et al., 2017). At best, we might expect that extrinsically erosion and water quality
motivated social norms are less intense and less likely to endure than more intrinsically motivated would be included in food
ones. Second, given that social expectations underpin social norms, norms themselves are
pricing). If the internalizing of dynamic (Bicchieri, 2017). environmental costs drove
We argue that the nature of environmental systems makes it difficult for individuals to estimate behavioral change, this
the costs and benefits of specific decisions, which is an essential component of rational choice change might embed itself as
models. Ecosystem service frameworks have a role to play by helping individuals understand the
a social norm, reinforcing the
value (monetary or otherwise) of ecosystems (Daily et al., 2000). Furthermore, there is theoretical behavior itself.
and empirical evidence that social norms play an important role in cooperative decision making The complexity of
about the environment. For example, Byerly et al. (2018) suggest that “nudging” (or making good environmental systems
behavior easier, using positive reinforcement, and making indirect suggestions) can motivate pro- causes three challenges for
environmental behaviors around energy use, recycling and other actions (Thaler and Sunstein, behavioral change because it
2009). In many cases, these are settings where there is a direct benefit to the participant, and the
is difficult for an individual to
norms tend to be approval-based. discern: 1) whether a given
Given that engrained social norms do support proenvironmental behaviors (Farrow et al., 2017; action (which carries some
Byerly et al., 2018), an obvious question is how and where to try to use them for environmental or cost) will have the desired
social benefit. According to Clayton et al. (2013), such efforts require identifying desired behaviors environmental effect; 2)
and their determinants. We argue that social norms are likely to be most useful for local-scale whether there will be an
problems and where there are immediate and tangible rewards. Care must also be taken to avoid associated social reward; and
perverse and unanticipated outcomes. For example, Schultz et al. (2007) demonstrate that 3) the magnitude of that
providing normative information influences behaviors on either side of the norm. In particular, reward. The combination of
they highlight the risk of “boomerang effects” where individuals are released from fear of these three factors risks
sanctioning (they describe this outcome when discussing alcohol consumption, when those who making the individual feel
discover that they consume less than the norm may feel permitted to increase their consumption). powerless in the face of a
Likewise, efforts to foster social norms must acknowledge their interdependent and multi-level large and amorphous
nature; that is, approval and sanctioning occur at multiple social levels from the individual to the problem like climate change. community (Bicchieri, 2017). Powerlessness (or lack of
Ultimately, environmental issues require multiple solutions (Otto et al., 2020). Social norms do selfefficacy) makes it easier
contribute to the maintenance and change of behavior; however, as we have argued, the potential for an individual to justify
for using norms to change behavior is likely restricted to specific problems where the rewards of deciding against pro-
certain behaviors are tangible and outweigh the benefits of not doing it. Many of our environmental behavior
environmental issues are spatially diffuse and play out over extended time-frames, which despite strong
increases our psychological distance from them. In such settings, norms may be less effective. One proenvironmental values.
solution is to reframe what are perceived as global and diffuse issues as local problems that
individuals can help to solve; this is not a new idea, it is the essence of the “think global, act local” approach.
Frontiers in Environmental Science | www.frontiersin.org 5 June 2021 | Volume 9 | Article 620125 lOMoAR cPSD| 32573545
Perry et al. Social Norms and Pro-Environmental Behaviors CONCLUSION
interact. Thus the singular effect of norms is near impossible to assess. Such understanding could
improve norms’ influence on behavior. Identifying the characteristics of pro-environmental If policymakers seek to
behavioral initiatives that ‘stick’, compared to those that ultimately fail, would be a valuable step. engineer new, or foster
A stronger focus on the robust evaluation of the contribution of social norms to pro-environmental existing, proenvironmental
behaviors and decision-making could guide the development and success of more enduring social norms, careful proenvironmental initiatives. consideration must be given to assessing norms’ effectiveness in specific DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
contexts ( social, cultural and ecological). Unfortunately,
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/Supplementary empirical demonstration of
Material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
the success of social norms is AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
often lacking, in part because behavioral changes are
This perspective results from a workshop that all authors attended and contributed substantially typically engineered through
to. GP and SR led writing of the manuscript and all co-authors contributed materially to writing a mixed-policy response and revision of drafts. (including regulatory and non-regulatory responses, education, and financial ACKNOWLEDGMENTS incentives); and government agencies rarely analyze how
We acknowledge funding from the Biological Heritage National Science Challenge (Project 3.1) these policy responses
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