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Title: Second Treatise of Government Author: John Locke Posting Date: July
28, 2010 [EBook #7370] Release Date: January, 2005 Last updated: October 20,
2011 Last updated: April 1, 2012 Language: English Character set encoding:
ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT *** HTML version produced by Chuck Greif.
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT by JOHN LOCKE
Digitized by Dave Gowan (dgowan@tfn.net). John Locke's "Second Treatise of
Government" was published in 1690. The complete unabridged text has been
republished several times in edited commentaries. This text is recovered
entire from the paperback book, "John Locke Second Treatise of Government",
Edited, with an Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company,
Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition is included
in the Etext below; only the original words contained in the 1690 Locke text
is included. The 1690 edition text is free of copyright.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT BY IOHN LOCKE SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO LONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIII
REPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A. MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1.
WHISTON AND B. WHITE, 1. RIVINGTON, L. DAVIS AND C. REYMERS, R.
BALDWIN, HAWES CLARKE AND COLLINS; W. IOHNSTON, W. OWEN, 1.
RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T. LONGMAN, B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E.
DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S. BAKER, T. PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN MDCCLXIII
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE FALSE
PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS
FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN. THE LATTER IS AN
ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
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1764 EDITOR'S NOTE The present Edition of this Book has not only been collated
with the first three Editions, which were published during the Author's Life, but also
has the Advantage of his last Corrections and Improvements, from a Copy delivered
by him to Mr. Peter Coste, communicated to the Editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge. CHAPTER:
I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII., VIII., IX., X., XI., XII., XIII., XIV., XV., XVI., XVII. , XVIII., XIX. PREFACE
Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning
government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up
the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to tell thee. These,
which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our
present King William; to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which
being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any
prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love
of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation
when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I
flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are
lost, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have neither
the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting part of my answer,
by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the windings and obscurities, which are to be
met with in the several branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the
nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his Hypothesis, that I suppose no body
hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common safety, and be
again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions
dressed up in a popular stile, and well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the
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pains, himself, in those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert's
discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words
to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another,
he will quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put together in
well-sounding English. If he think it not worth while to examine his works all thro', let
him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let him try,
whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and consistent with
himself, or common sense. I should not speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since
past answering, had not the pulpit, of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and
made it the current divinity of the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on
them to be teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of
what authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they
may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be
maintained; or else justify those principles which they preached up for gospel; though
they had no better an author than an English courtier: for I should not have writ
against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want
of (what he so much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were
there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his doctrine,
save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been so
zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope they should
spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the public wrong, they would be
as ready to redress it, and allow its just weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot
be done a greater mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions
concerning government; that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of
the Drum Ecclesiastic. If any one, concerned really for truth, undertake the
confutation of my Hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake, upon fair
conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two things.
First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident of my
discourse, is not an answer to my book.
Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of these worth
my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to any
one, who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and shall shew
any just grounds for his scruples.
I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations stands for
Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pages always means
pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680.
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AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,
(1). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by positive
donation from God, any such authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended:
(2). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:
(3). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God that
determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession,
and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined:
(4). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest
line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind
and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the least pretence to
be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance:
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the
rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of
authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private
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dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think
that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that
men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it,
and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and
rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must
of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power,
and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be
political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a subject may be
distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a MASTER over his servant,
a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his slave. All which distinct powers
happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these
different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a
father of a family, and a captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with
penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and
preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution
of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good. CHAPTER. II.
OF THE STATE OF NATURE.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must
consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
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A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and
the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any
manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so
evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that
obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one
another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty,
to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all
have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's
hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of
my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is
undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing
offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much
as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others
should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them:
my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be,
imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection;
from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves,
what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man
is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though
man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or
possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his
possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state
of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which
is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions:
for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all
the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his
business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his,
not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one
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community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that
may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as
the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve
himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own
preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the
rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or
impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from
doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace
and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put
into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of
that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as
all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there were no body that in
the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent
and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for
any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where
naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do
in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another;
but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his
hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will;
but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is
proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and
restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to
another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the
offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common
equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual
security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them
from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass
against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of
nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general,
may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may
bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent
the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like
mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO
PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
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Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but
before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state
can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is
certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of
the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound
to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the
subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the
supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but
like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature
every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case
to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of
another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what
every man naturally may have over another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from
the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares
himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is
commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage
by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the
right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek
reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also
join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much
as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint,
and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of
taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the
magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his
hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit
the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the
satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit:
the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service
of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the
crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all
mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is,
that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter
others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the
example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men
from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and
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measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he
hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be
destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can
have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature,
Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully
convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder
of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was it
writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser
breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each
transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will
suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify
others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature,
may in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a
commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into
the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain
there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a
studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as
much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances
of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are a great
part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are
founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the
executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men
partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion
and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but
confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed
government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil
government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which
must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to
be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so
just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to
remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy
of those evils, which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases,
and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of
government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man,
commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to
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all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or
controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by
reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of
nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he
that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any
men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that
since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a
state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of
men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether
they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end
to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to
enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts,
men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises
and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by
Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the
woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature,
in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will
not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says,
The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men
absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship,
never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but
forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent
store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the
dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as
living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion
and fellowship with others: this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies.
But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by
their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and I
doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.
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Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore
declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design
upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has
declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken
away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel;
it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me
with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as
much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be
preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an
enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such
men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that of
force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and
noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.
Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute
power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood
as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who
would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when
he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can
desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that
which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such
force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an
enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it;
so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of
war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs
to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away
every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the
state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or
commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else,
and so be looked on as in a state of war.
Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt
him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to
get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him;
because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence
be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty,
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would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it
is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me,
i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever
introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the
state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state
of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice,
violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men living together according
to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them,
is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the
person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief,
is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war
even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief,
whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I
may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law,
which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from
present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence,
and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not
time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case
where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts
all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of
war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.
Sect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those
that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of
the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to
prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of
positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun,
continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can,
until the aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair
any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an
appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a
manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or
indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to
imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is used, and injury done,
though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury,
however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to
protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are
under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who
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having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and
wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide
between the contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society,
and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from
which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is
excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such
court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and
the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was forced to
appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this day between the children
of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying
on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such controversies,
where the question is put, who shall be judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide
the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge
shall judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That
question then cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a
state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in it? of that
I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day,
to the supreme judge of all men. CHAPTER. IV. OF SLAVERY.
Sect. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth,
and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of
nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative
power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion
of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to
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the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations,
A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be
tied by any laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to
live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power
erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes
not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of
another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.
Sect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and
closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what
forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own
life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put
himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he
pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take
away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault
forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it,
may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own
service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his
slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his
master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
Sect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state
of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact
enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and
obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact
endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that
which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.
I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell
themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident,
the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master
could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged
to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from
having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as
maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.
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Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once
born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such
other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an
account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it
is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the
children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to
some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any
thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property,
upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it
is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any property
upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession,
exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men
might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in
common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and
all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho'
all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common,
as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a
private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in
their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a
means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all
beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild
Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so
his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do
him any good for the support of his life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet
every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself.
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath
placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common
right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer,
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no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is
enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples
he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No
body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his?
when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them
home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not
his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that
added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and
so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns
or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to
make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in
common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding
the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that
it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature
leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And
the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the
commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore
I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others,
become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that
was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one's
appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants
could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in
common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running
in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only
who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was
common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is
allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was
the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilized part
of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this
original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still
takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great
and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up here, is
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by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his
property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is
hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that is still
looked upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever has employed so
much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed
her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other
fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much as he
will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature, that does by this means give
us property, does also bound that property too. God has given us all things richly, 1
Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given
it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it
spoils, so much he may by his Tabour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is
more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil
or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long
time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the
industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others;
especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use;
there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.
Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and
the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in and carries with
it all the rest; I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As
much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so
much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common.
Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; and
therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his
fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all
mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it
of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the
benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He
that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it,
thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to,
nor could without injury take from him.
Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any
prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more
than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for
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others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can
make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself injured
by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river
of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where
there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their
benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it
cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He
gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;)
not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as
good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought
not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he did, it is
plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to, and not the
ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof
there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do
with, or his industry could reach to.
Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, where
there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one
can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners;
because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be
violated. And though it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all
mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the
remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as
the whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning
and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite otherwise. The law
man was under, was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced
him to labour. That was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever
he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we
see are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding
to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the condition of human life, which
requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions.
Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's labour
and the conveniencies of life: no man's labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor
could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any
man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property,
to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good, and as large
a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This
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measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion, and such
as he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the first ages of the
world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their company,
in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant
in. And the same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to any body, as full
as the world seems: for supposing a man, or family, in the state they were at first
peopling of the world by the children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland,
vacant places of America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself,
upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day,
prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think themselves
injured by this man's incroachment, though the race of men have now spread
themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the small number
was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value, without labour,
that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough,
sow and reap, without being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his
making use of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to
him, who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increased
the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on;
this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man should
have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without
straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the
inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a
value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which,
how it has done, I shall by and by shew more at large.
Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than
man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their
usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which
would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a
whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one
of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be
much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who
would use the same industry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to
himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for
the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed
and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more than those
which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. And
therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life
from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to
give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of
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ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I have here
rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is
much nearer an hundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated
waste of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a
thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of
life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed,
caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains
about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the
state which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby
acquire a propriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their due
use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended
against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his
neighbour's share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and
they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.
Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too: whatsoever he
tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar
right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the cattle and product
was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit
of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth,
notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the
possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he
could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to Abel's sheep to feed on; a
few acres would serve for both their possessions. But as families increased, and
industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need of them; but yet
it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, till they
incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they
came in time, to set out the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits
between them and their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the
properties of those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the world which
was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as
Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was their
substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a
stranger. Whence it is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that
the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use of.
But when there was not room enough in the same place, for their herds to feed
together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and
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