lOMoARcPSD| 58562220
Corporate Finance
Quesons and Pracce problems_Chapter 17
Chapter 17:
Concept quesons (page 553 textbook): 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Quesons and Problems (page 554 textbook): 1, 2, 3, 4
Answers:
Concept quesons:
2. The statement is incorrect. If a rm has debt, it might be advantageous to stockholders for
the rm to undertake risky projects, even those with negave net present values. This
incenve results from the fact that most of the risk of failure is borne by bondholders.
Therefore, value is transferred from the bondholders to the shareholders by undertaking
risky projects, even if the projects have negave NPVs. This incenve is even stronger when
the probability and costs of bankruptcy are high.
3. The rm should issue equity in order to nance the project. The tax-loss carry-forwards make
the rm’s eecve tax rate zero. Therefore, the company will not benet from the tax shield
that debt provides. Moreover, since the rm already has a moderate amount of debt in its
capital structure, addional debt will likely increase the probability that the rm will face
nancial distress or bankruptcy. As long as there are more bankruptcy costs, the rm should
issue equity in order to nance the project.
4. Stockholders can undertake the following measures in order to minimize the costs of debt:
1) Use protecve covenants. Firms can enter into agreements with the bondholders that are
designed to decrease the cost of debt. There are two types of protecve covenants. Negave
covenants prohibit the company from taking acons that would expose the bondholders to
potenal losses. An example would be prohibing the payment of dividends in excess of
earnings. Posive covenants specify an acon that the company agrees to take or a condion
the company must abide by. An example would be agreeing to maintain its working capital
at a minimum level.
2) Repurchase debt. A rm can eliminate the costs of bankruptcy by eliminang debt from
its capital structure.
3) Consolidate debt. If a rm decreases the number of debt holders, it may be able to
decrease the direct costs of bankruptcy should the rm become insolvent.
5. Modigliani and Millers theory with corporate taxes indicates that, since there is a posive
tax advantage of debt, the rm should maximize the amount of debt in its capital structure.
In reality, however, no rm adopts an all-debt nancing strategy. MM’s theory ignores both
the nancial distress and agency costs of debt. The marginal costs of debt connue to
increase with the amount of debt in the rm’s capital structure so that, at some point, the
marginal costs of addional debt will outweigh its marginal tax benets. Therefore, there is
lOMoARcPSD| 58562220
an opmal level of debt for every rm at the point where the marginal tax benets of the
debt equal the marginal increase in nancial distress and agency costs.
6. There are two major sources of the agency costs of equity:
1) Shirking. Managers with small equity holdings have a tendency to reduce their work
eort, thereby hurng both the debt holders and outside equity holders.
2) Perquisites. Since management receives all the benets of increased perquisites but
only shoulder a fracon of the cost, managers have an incenve to overspend on
luxury items at the expense of debt holders and outside equity holders.
Quesons and Problems:
1. a. Using M&M Proposion I with taxes, the value of a levered rm is:
V
L
= $5,191,785.71
b. The CFO may be correct. The value calculated in part a does not include costs of debt such as
bankruptcy or agency costs.
2. a. Debt issue:
The company needs a cash infusion of $1.3 million. If the company issues debt, the annual
interest payments will be:
Interest = $104,000
The cash ow to the owner will be the EBIT minus the interest payments, or:
40-hour week cash ow = $446,000
50-hour week cash ow = $521,000
Equity issue:
If the company issues equity, the company value will increase by the amount of the issue. So,
the current owners equity interest in the company will decrease to: Tom’s ownership percentage
= $3,200,000 / ($3,200,000 + 1,300,000) = .71
So, Tom’s cash ow under an equity issue will be 71 percent of EBIT, or:
40-hour week cash ow = $390,500
50-hour week cash ow = $443,750
b. Tom will work harder under the debt issue since his cash ows will be higher. Tom will gain
more under this form of nancing since the payments to bondholders are xed. Under an
equity issue, new investors share proporonally in his hard work, which will reduce his
propensity for this addional work.
lOMoARcPSD| 58562220
c. The direct cost of both issues is the payments made to new investors. The indirect costs to
the debt issue include potenal bankruptcy and nancial distress costs. The indirect costs of
an equity issue include shirking and perquisites.
3. According to M&M Proposion I with taxes, the value of the levered rm is: V
T
= V
L
=
$19,950,000
We can also calculate the market value of the rm by adding the market value of the debt and
equity. Using this procedure, the total market value of the rm is:
V
M
= B + S
V
M
= $19,300,000
With no non-marketed claims, such as bankruptcy costs, we would expect the two values to be
the same. The dierence is the value of the non-marketed claims. V
T
= V
M
+ V
N
$19,950,000 = $19,300,000 + V
N
V
N
= $650,000
4. The president may be correct, but he may also be incorrect. It is true that the interest
tax shield is valuable, and adding debt can possibly increase the value of the company.
However, if the companys debt is increased beyond some level, the value of the
interest tax shield becomes less than the addional costs from nancial distress.

Preview text:

lOMoAR cPSD| 58562220 Corporate Finance
Questions and Practice problems_Chapter 17 Chapter 17:
Concept questions (page 553 textbook): 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Questions and Problems (page 554 textbook): 1, 2, 3, 4 Answers:
Concept questions:
2. The statement is incorrect. If a firm has debt, it might be advantageous to stockholders for
the firm to undertake risky projects, even those with negative net present values. This
incentive results from the fact that most of the risk of failure is borne by bondholders.
Therefore, value is transferred from the bondholders to the shareholders by undertaking
risky projects, even if the projects have negative NPVs. This incentive is even stronger when
the probability and costs of bankruptcy are high.
3. The firm should issue equity in order to finance the project. The tax-loss carry-forwards make
the firm’s effective tax rate zero. Therefore, the company will not benefit from the tax shield
that debt provides. Moreover, since the firm already has a moderate amount of debt in its
capital structure, additional debt will likely increase the probability that the firm will face
financial distress or bankruptcy. As long as there are more bankruptcy costs, the firm should
issue equity in order to finance the project.
4. Stockholders can undertake the following measures in order to minimize the costs of debt:
1) Use protective covenants. Firms can enter into agreements with the bondholders that are
designed to decrease the cost of debt. There are two types of protective covenants. Negative
covenants prohibit the company from taking actions that would expose the bondholders to
potential losses. An example would be prohibiting the payment of dividends in excess of
earnings. Positive covenants specify an action that the company agrees to take or a condition
the company must abide by. An example would be agreeing to maintain its working capital at a minimum level.
2) Repurchase debt. A firm can eliminate the costs of bankruptcy by eliminating debt from its capital structure.
3) Consolidate debt. If a firm decreases the number of debt holders, it may be able to
decrease the direct costs of bankruptcy should the firm become insolvent.
5. Modigliani and Miller’s theory with corporate taxes indicates that, since there is a positive
tax advantage of debt, the firm should maximize the amount of debt in its capital structure.
In reality, however, no firm adopts an all-debt financing strategy. MM’s theory ignores both
the financial distress and agency costs of debt. The marginal costs of debt continue to
increase with the amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure so that, at some point, the
marginal costs of additional debt will outweigh its marginal tax benefits. Therefore, there is lOMoAR cPSD| 58562220
an optimal level of debt for every firm at the point where the marginal tax benefits of the
debt equal the marginal increase in financial distress and agency costs.
6. There are two major sources of the agency costs of equity:
1) Shirking. Managers with small equity holdings have a tendency to reduce their work
effort, thereby hurting both the debt holders and outside equity holders.
2) Perquisites. Since management receives all the benefits of increased perquisites but
only shoulder a fraction of the cost, managers have an incentive to overspend on
luxury items at the expense of debt holders and outside equity holders.
Questions and Problems:
1. a. Using M&M Proposition I with taxes, the value of a levered firm is: VL = $5,191,785.71
b. The CFO may be correct. The value calculated in part a does not include costs of debt such as bankruptcy or agency costs.
2. a. Debt issue:
The company needs a cash infusion of $1.3 million. If the company issues debt, the annual interest payments will be: Interest = $104,000
The cash flow to the owner will be the EBIT minus the interest payments, or:
40-hour week cash flow = $446,000
50-hour week cash flow = $521,000 Equity issue:
If the company issues equity, the company value will increase by the amount of the issue. So,
the current owner’s equity interest in the company will decrease to: Tom’s ownership percentage
= $3,200,000 / ($3,200,000 + 1,300,000) = .71
So, Tom’s cash flow under an equity issue will be 71 percent of EBIT, or:
40-hour week cash flow = $390,500
50-hour week cash flow = $443,750
b. Tom will work harder under the debt issue since his cash flows will be higher. Tom will gain
more under this form of financing since the payments to bondholders are fixed. Under an
equity issue, new investors share proportionally in his hard work, which will reduce his
propensity for this additional work. lOMoAR cPSD| 58562220
c. The direct cost of both issues is the payments made to new investors. The indirect costs to
the debt issue include potential bankruptcy and financial distress costs. The indirect costs of
an equity issue include shirking and perquisites.
3. According to M&M Proposition I with taxes, the value of the levered firm is: VT = VL = $19,950,000
We can also calculate the market value of the firm by adding the market value of the debt and
equity. Using this procedure, the total market value of the firm is:
VM = B + S VM = $19,300,000
With no non-marketed claims, such as bankruptcy costs, we would expect the two values to be
the same. The difference is the value of the non-marketed claims. VT = VM + VN
$19,950,000 = $19,300,000 + VN VN = $650,000
4. The president may be correct, but he may also be incorrect. It is true that the interest
tax shield is valuable, and adding debt can possibly increase the value of the company.
However, if the company’s debt is increased beyond some level, the value of the
interest tax shield becomes less than the additional costs from financial distress.