Vietnam War Victory Analysis: Final Exam Notes | Môn Vietnamese History and Culture - Trường Đại học Quốc tế, Đại học Quốc gia Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh

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How and Why did the Vietnamese people win the Viet
Nam War( 1954 – 1975)?
I/ Some general information: 1/ Names of the war:
From the Vietnamese perspectives: in Vietnamese “Cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ, cứu
nước” (the resistant war against American for national salvation);
From the American perspectives: in English + the Vietnamese war + the Viet Nam war
+ the American war in Viet Nam
From both sides, in English: the Viet Nam war.
3/ The periodization of the war: From the Vietnamese
- 1954-1960: Defeating the “One-side war”( “Unilateral war”) by President Eisenhower; -
1961-1965: Defeating the Special war strategy by President Kennedy and President Johnson;
- 1965-1968: Defeating the Local ( Limited) war strategy by President Johnson
-1969-1972 Defeating Vietnamization of the war strategy by President Nixon -1973-1975:
Defeating the final efforts of Vietnamization of the war strategy for liberating the whole South Viet Nam. From the American
- 1965-1968: the local war ( limited War) strategy by President Johnson
-1969-1972 : the Vietnamization of the war strategy by President Nixon
-1973-1975: the final efforts of Vietnamization of the war by President Nixon and President Ford.
4/Could we (American and Vietnamese) have avoided this war?
No. The domination of bi-polar geopolitical world order leading to deep reasons of the
Viet Nam war. We could not have avoided this war. Yes. We could…
+Typically, Prof Mark Philip Bradley made clear that
(1)Ho Chi Minh had many efforts to contact with the American: As soon as the August
revolution, Ho Chi Minh sent 8 letters to President Truman (no reply from Truman), lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
(2) In 1947 Ho Chi Minh sent The Pham Ngoc Thach delegation to Thailand in order to
contact with the embassy of the US,.. ( once again Truman had no reply).
+Why did the American refused Ho Chi Minh’s proposals? The Mc Carthyism was
dominating American politics at that time? (“ the ghost of communism” !)
5/Military Art and Strategy
+Definition of the ‘’ military Art”, “military strategy” term.
A system of military viewpoints, concrete arts, strategy, campaign, tactics,…for winning the war.
Ex, The military art of knowing how to win in every step exactly defeating ideology for
the escalation of war in condition of bipolar world order.
+Nature of the Neo-colonialist war - Neo-colonialism - Neo-colonialist war
+ Nature of the People’s war – Vietnamese
Revolutionary war/ resistant war against invaders for
national independence and democracy.
+The “historical clash” between Vietnam and America: the international revolutionary
forces/ world imperialism headed by the American. The bipolar world order was reflected in the Viet Nam war.
6/SOME BASIC VIEWPOINTS FOR THE WAR OPERATION OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
1 /Summary of the U.S. Military history –Military doctrine based on the emphasis on
firepower, modern weapons, etc. of the U.S. Army (“American power”)
2 /Theory of Attrition Warfare (“War of attrition”) in the American Military Strategies
3 /Theory of Conventional Warfare, Counter-insurgency War, and Nuclear Warfare
4 /Theory of Flexible Response and the Escalation of war
5/ The Nixon doctrine: American power + skillful diplomacy”, “the chess of China” on the Asian table.
7/BASIC CONTENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL ART OF WAR AND THE THEORY OF PEOPLE’S WAR STRATEGY
1 /People’s war in the comprehensive, long-term, relied mainly on their own strength way
2/ Art of winning step by step in the right way and at the right time 3 /Theory of Offensive Strategy
4 /The comprehensive power of People’s war lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
5/ Methods of revolutionary, methods of conducting People’s war (the combined
revolutionary violence: two legs, three heads, three areas, three types of armies, three
scales, three battlefields, offensing-uprising, uprising-offensing, offensing-general offensing and uprising, etc.)
8/ “Formula to win” or the methodology of conducting “revolutionary violence”:
X= {2,2,3,3,3,3,2,2,3,…2}
2 : local uprisings – revolutionary war
2: 2 feet ( military- political forces)
3: 3 arrows (military- political struggles, mobilization of the enemy)
3 regions( mountain rural, delta rural, urban area)
3 armies ( regular, local, guerrilla)
3 scales ( large, medium, small) 2 offensives – uprisings
2 General offensives- uprisings
3 fronts ( military, political, diplomatic fronts) 2 General offensives- uprisings : to win the war.
II/The Viet Nam War
1/ Defeating the one-side war by President Eisenhower (1954-1960)
a/ The Eisenhower strategy: The “one-side “ war.
The nature of the Geneva agreement: Although Viet Nam had defeated the French in
Dien Bien Phu , it could liberate only a half country. The Geneva agreement was a limited victory.
What was reason for that? ( balance of power, interests of some powers, super powers
around the Geneva solution for the Viet Nam, the ticklishness of China,…).
The American jumped down South Viet Nam to establish neo-colonialism in order to
stop the development of communism in S.E.A. (the Domino theory and the Eisenhower strategy ).
+ Politically, the government of Ngo Dinh Diem; a repressive machine controlled the whole
South from Saigon capital to the most remote villages (Massacres, tortures, deportations,
mass imprisonment and raids,…).
+ In military, building up the Saigon army; under the support of the US the Diem
government suppressed bloodily the revolutionary and patriotic forces in the South. In
the early 1960, had 100,000 Saigon troops. lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
+Economically,…starting some infrastructures of neo-colonial economy
+ Culturally,...some neo-colonial factors transmitted into the South b/
Defeating the Eisenhower strategy:
According to the Geneva agreement, the Vietnamese revolutionaries had to accept the
regroup of cadres, troops into the North (deep reasons?)
South Vietnam Imbalance of power in favorable direction to Saigon and American :
100,000 revolutionary troops had to regroup to the North ; the revolutionary, patriotic
forces were suppressed bloodily.
What were some regrettable disadvantages to revolutionaries? The Revolutionaries
applied only political struggles mainly. It was very late to have revolutionary way for the Southern revolution ( 1956:
The Le Duan ‘’Outline for Southern Revolution’’ appeared, but not yet outline by the
Central Committee). It was also very slow to have combination of political and military
struggles, even though Vietnamese revolutionaries had had good experiences of
revolutionary violence in the August Revolution -1945. The political movements from
1954-56 and 1957-1959 were only political movements without armed struggle! All of
them were suppressed bloodily by Saigon Army and Police.
The 15th Central resolution of the Party( 1-1959) has launched the ideology of
revolutionary violence for the South. Analyzing dialectically the balance of power in
1959 to reconfirm favorable moment of the simultaneous uprisings ( “ Dong Khoi ”).
In August 1959, in Tra Bong and western Quang Ngai uprising had the important
significance. In January 1960, the uprisings in Ben Tre ( Dinh Thuy, Binh Khanh, Phuoc
Hiep,…) started the Dong Khoi in the Mekong delta.
Analyzing the favorable moment for the 1959-1960 Dong Khoi Simultaneous uprisings:
+ American/ Saigon side:
- Strength: + Regular army (100,000 troops); police, system of local government, American support,…
- Weakness: +Political failure: the mass did not support government ( unjust cause);+ Revolutionary side:
-Strength: + Just cause( the mass has supported…) + good cadres, good system of local
Party,...; strong political force.
- Weakness: + No armed forces/ weapons,…
So, having not yet favorable moment in entire South VN; but there were favorable
moments in many localities in SVN. c/The significances for the victory of the Dong Khoi:
+ Defeating the Eisenhower strategy: the Unilateral war failed down! lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
+ Changing posture of the Southern revolution from defensive to attacking on the basis of revolutionary violence.
+ Learning some experiences of revolutionary violence.
2/ Defeating the special war strategy by President Kennedy and President Johnson (1960-1965):
a/ The special war strategy:
What was the bi-polar world order and its influences to Viet Nam? The Soviet –USA :
only the “cold war”. The “hot war” was only in the third world. The case of Vietnam:
Applying the escalation of war ideology in the Viet Nam war.
President Kennedy applied the “Flexible Response” global strategy with 3 wars: the
Special war (the war of the American without the attendance of the American army), the
Local war ( Limited war) and the All-out war( similar to the world war). The special war :
+ Building up the stronger Saigon army
+ The new tactics: “the helicopter tactic”, “the armored personnel carrier ( tank) tactic”;
+Establishing the system of the strategic hamlets ( 18,000 as planned) to perform the
slogan “bail water out…for catching fishes” b/ Defeating the “special war” strategy (
Kennedy and Johnson ):
Applying the methodology: 2 feet, 3 arrows ( “one point of three attacks), 3 regions, 3 armies,…
The Ap Bac victory( 1/1963): ability to beat the special war. For the first time “the
helicopter ”, “the armored personnel carrier” tactics were defeated by revolutionary troops.
The victories of Binh Gia, Ba Gia , Dong Xoai, Deo Nhong , An Lao from the late 1964
until the mid-1965 demonstrated the ability to win the Saigon regular army in the
special war. They would lead to the unavoidable collapse of the special war. The
political movements in urban and rural areas, especially student, worker, Buddhist
movements in Saigon –Hue,...
The system of strategic hamlets in rural area collapsed basically until the late 1963.
c/ The significances :
+ Defeating the special strategy was the second strategic victory
+ Changing the balance of power in the South. The first step for the escalation of war failed
down. The American had passively changed into the higher step of the local war strategy. lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
3/Defeating the local war strategy in the South and the war of destruction in the North
by President Johnson (1965-1968):
a/ The local war strategy:
On the failed posture of the special war, President Johnson had to change into the local
war with the direct attendance of American and allied armies ( South Korean, Australian, …).
The American performed the counterattacks within two arrows: “ search and destroy”
and “ rural pacification” in order to destroy the revolutionary regular forces ( “ to break
“the backbone of the VC”) and “to win the heart and the mind of peasants” for controlling
population and land in the rural area.
Analyzing the balance of power in 1965:
+ American/ Sai Gon side: -
Strength: + Regular army (180,000 US+ 600,000 Saigon troops;); American
support ( modern weapon, US dollars,…) -
Weakness: +Political failure ( unjust cause war); passive posture of failure in the special war. + Revolutionary side:
-Strength: + Just cause war/ the great rear in the North VN /strong political force/ the
supports of international socialism and progressive forces. VN could prolong the war in
order to win exactly in every step. -
Weakness: + Poor economy, limitation of modern weapons, … So, the
Vietnamese could win the Local war in the long-term war!
b/ Defeating the local war in the South and the war of destruction in the North Totally:
+ In 1965: 180,000 American troops – 600, 000 Saigon troops.
+ In 1968 : 543,000 American troops and 800, 000 Saigon troops
The 1965-1966 dry season: 450 “search and destroy” operations; the 1966-67 dry
season : 895 “search and destroy” operations, especially 3 key operations : Attleboro,
Cedar Falls and Junction city operations ( 35,000 American troops + 10,000 Saigon troops).
All of American counter-attack operations failed down.
Malcolm Browne, journalist, decided Westmoreland’s strategy was “like a
sledgehammer on a floating cork, somehow the cork refused to stay down” ( Most of the
“search and destroy” operations could not search for VC troops to destroy! )
The Vietnamese defeated most of these operations for continuing development of the
attacking posture. The campaigns of rural pacification were also collapsed step by step. lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
In the North, the war of destruction by naval and air forces ( from 1965-1968) failed down heavily.
In the early 1968 the balance of power was changed in favorable direction to
revolutionary force in Viet Nam.
Utilizing the favorable moment in the early Spring- 1968, the Vietnamese forces
launched the general offensive and uprisings for attacking simultaneously most of cities,
downtowns in the South. The revolutionaries started to send the war into urban area of
the South. Due to some great mistakes, the revolutionary troops had to sacrifice a lot, but
basically it was the strategic victory. The American had to stop the local war strategy.
c/ Significances:
-Defeating completely the local war was the 3rd strategic victory of Viet Nam in the Viet Nam war.
- The American had to de-escalate the war and accept the four- side Paris peace talk
with the Vietnamese revolutionaries. President Johnson was enforced to stop the sending
of American troops into the South.
4/Defeating the Vietnamization of the war strategy by President Nixon (1969-1972):
a/ The Vietnamization of the war strategy:
Richard Nixon launched the new global strategy so-called as “the Nixon doctrine”: (+ the
US strength +Readiness to negotiate + Sharing the responsibility). “American power +
skillful diplomacy”. Nixon tried to play “the chess of China” on the Asian table.
On the failed posture of the local war with half million American troops, President Nixon
had to change into the new strategy so-called as Vietnamization of the war with the step-
by- step withdrawal of American army out of Viet Nam.
The Vietnamization of the war strategy was filled with deep contradictions. Nixon
wanted to de-escalate the war, but on the stronger posture to win the war. It was very
unreasonable. Based on the maximal increase of fire-power, he wanted to overcome this military contradiction.
The protection of South Viet Nam could be ensured only if Laos and Cambodia were
integrated the US sphere of influence. Therefore the Vietnamization of the war had to
lead the Indochinization of war.
b/ Defeating the Vietnamization of the war strategy in the South and the second war
of destruction in the North lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
In 1969, American troops started to counter-attack the rural area and control more and
more population and land. Revolutionaries lost the liberated zones, especially in the Mekong delta.
In 1970, revolutionary forces defeated the great operations by 100,000 American –
Saigon troops to Cambodia. In 1971 Vietnamese revolutionaries continue to win the Lam
Son -719 operations in the Southern Laos by 45,000 American –Saigon troops. The
Indochinization of the war collapsed basically. In 1972 Vietnamese revolutionaries
launched the Spring-Summer campaigns to counter-attack the Saigon troops in Quang
Tri, highland and Southeastern areas of the South.
In the North, although there were lots of heavy damages from the American bombing,
the Vietnamese continued to win the second war of destruction by naval and air forces (
from April to December, 1972), especially the 12-day bombing in Ha Noi and Hai Phong
cities. Nixon could not change the will of Vietnamese people. The failure of the B52s in
North Viet Nam compelled Nixon to halt the bombing and return to Paris negotiating table.
The diplomatic struggle in the Paris peace talk from 1968 to 1972, Vietnamese
delegation developed the wining posture of military political victory from Viet Nam for
attacking American-Saigon delegations.
The Paris-1973 agreement (“ the Agreement on the Cessation of the War and the
Restoration of Peace in Vietnam”) was the great turning point of the Vietnam War. The
American army must withdraw out of Viet Nam.
c/ Significances:
- The Paris-1973 agreement was the great strategic victory of the Vietnamese people
bringing to the period of final victory: The American Army went out; the imbalance of
power in South Viet Nam appeared in favorable direction to revolutionary forces. The Saigon would collapse.
- The U.S should respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people.
5/Defeating the final efforts of the Vietnamization for liberating the whole South Viet Nam(1973-1975):
a/ Balance of power after the Paris agreement.
Imbalance of power in favorable direction to Vietnamese revolutionaries: Before the
US, Saigon Armies could not win. Now, the American army withdrew; the Saigon army would collapse !
The American and the Saigon regime wanted to destroy the Paris agreement in order to
perform the rural pacification and defeating revolutionary forces partly. Nixon had lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
declared that the Thieu administration was recognized as “the sole legitimate government
of South Viet nam”. The Saigon government violated the cease-fire and both sides tried to
gain control of as much territory as possible.
Recognizing exactly situation of the war for releasing the new way of revolutionary violence.
b/ The general offensive and uprisings in the 1975 Spring.
After the Paris Agreement, the US and Saigon had chosen the military solution. The
defeats of 1974 did not diminished their aggressiveness! In December 1974 there were
victories in some provinces. Particularly, the revolutionary victory of Phuoc Long (11975)
had the turning significance of Saigon-side weakness.
The Tay Nguyen Campaign ( March 10th – 12th ):
The Buon Ma Thuot victory of March 10th,1975 had the great significance. It has led to
the sudden mutation for imbalance of power. The SVN from the two- year of 1975-76 to
only a year of 1975. Only during 1975, the final general offensive and uprisings would be finished.
The Hue- Da Nang Campaign ( March 5th – April 2nd ):
For the new project of 1975 liberation, this campaign would liberate Quang Tri, Thua Thien
provinces and Hue, Da Nang cities.
The Ho Chi Minh Campaign ( April 26th – 30th ):
In the early April-1975, the Saigon forces regrouped around Sai Gon in defending the key
transportation of Phan Rang-Xuan Loc. They lost the will of fighting to defend the Saigon
regime. On 21 April, 1975 President Nguyen Van Thieu had to resign. There were a large
imbalance of power in Saigon battles: Saigon army having only 5 divisions; revolutionary
army about 5 army corps. In such favorable conditions, revolutionary forces defeated the
Saigon army in the best way for limiting ravages of the city: surrounding to defeat divisions
of regular army outside city; there were only small battles inside city. April 30th , 1975
Saigon was liberated . May 1st ,1975 the Mekong delta was completely liberated. The
Vietnamese people won the Viet Nam War!
III/ Significances, Reasons: 1/ Significances: -For the Vietnamese:
The great turning point in Vietnamese history ( Defeating the Viet Nam war would lead
to the southern liberation, the unification of the country, the era of independence and
freedom and comprehensive development towards socialism) - For the world:
The neo-colonialism that collapsed in Vietnam would lead to the basic changes for the
global strategy of the American in Asia. 2/ Reasons for the victory: lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008 a/ Subjective:
The political leadership; Vietnamese military arts ( strategy, tactics,…):
+ The attacking military strategy and the military art of knowing how to win in every step
exactly defeating ideology for the escalation of war in condition of bipolar world order.
+ “Formula to win” or the revolutionary methodology and way. Ideology of “synthetic revolutionary violence”.
The heroism of Vietnamese people ( the population from both the North-South,
Army,…developing the Vietnamese tradition of resistant struggles against foreign invaders). b/ Objective:
The international solidarity and supports to the Vietnamese people: Soviet Union, China,
other socialist countries and the progressive peoples in the world, including the
progressive American (the anti-war movement in the US,…).
________________________________________________________________________
How did the Vietnamese Revolutionary Government
overcome the difficulties and dangers soon after the
August-1945 Revolution ( September 1945- December 1946)?
I. Situation soon after the August Revolution:
-The socio-economic cultural difficulties:
+ The famine of 1944 had still not been brought under control when the biggest flood in
decades occurred in 1945 ( In the most populous provinces of the Red River delta,…). lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
The new government had to give rice to the people.
+ The illiteracy : 95% of population could not read and write…! The entire people had to
learn reading and writing Quoc ngu scripts!
+ The financial crisis: having not enough money for the new government to spend; the
new state at first had only 1.2 million piasters in its budget but a half no using by damage! - The dangerous situation:
Soon after the August Revolution, at the same time many enemies wanted to abrogate
the Vietnamese revolutionary government . *
200,000 Chiang Kai-shek troops commanded by General Lu Han with some
remnants of former nationalist parties ( Viet Quoc, Viet Cach), groups of politicians,…
came to the North ( reason : allied armies to disarm Japanese fascists). They wanted to
upset the new government of Viet Nam. *
In early September 1945 the British troops landed in Saigon. With the support of
the British troops, on the night of 22 September French troops attacked Saigon! The
reconquering war by French invaders had begun in Southern Viet Nam. The Nam Bo
Administrative Committee called on the people to fight back with the slogan: “Independence or death!”.
II. The Struggle of the Vietnamese people in overcoming many
difficulties, defeating many enemies in order to defend the
revolutionary government, independence and sovereignty of the country.
1/ Some important revolutionary methodologies and tactics:
+ How to overcome difficulties :
Mobilizing the support of entire people to overcome difficulties.
+ How to fight simultaneously with many enemies in conditions of imbalance of power:
The revolutionary government had to conduct the tactics of “To
Utilize contradictions among enemies; making concessions on the
basis of principles in order to focus on attacking vis- a-vis enemy in every period” 2/ Struggles:
a/ For the difficulties:
To mobilize the support of entire people in finding immediate or long-term measures to overcome . lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008 + Famine:
Soon after the August revolution, the famine was one of the major
challenges for the revolutionary government.
On September 3rd the campaign against famine was launched by President Ho Chi
Minh. It included mutual measures: sharing food with the most needy and increasing
agricultural production. Many volunteers travelled everywhere collecting food. The
dykes, canals,…were repaired.
The harvest of dry food crops in the end of 1945 and in early 1946 increased
dramatically. The success of the fight against famine was as one of typical evidences
for organizational ability and dedication of the revolutionary government. + Illiteracy:
Parallel to the fight against famine, another nationwide campaign against illiteracy
was also launched. 100,000 volunteer teacher and over 70,000 classes were organized
in everywhere. For one year there were about 2.5 million people learned to read and write Quoc ngu .
+ The financial difficulties:
The revolutionary government tried to overcome the financial difficulties and to
avoid the financial crisis. With the large supports from population, right from the
beginning the government issued to the population a vast collection of valuables, gold
and silver to pay the most urgent expenses.
For many months, officials worked without salary.
In January, 1946 the first Vietnamese dongs were put into circulation. This currency
was not based on gold reserves or foreign exchange. It based on only the patriotism and
the trust of the masses! The dong was exchanged on a par with the Indochinese piastre.
b/ For enemies:
To distinguish exactly immediate enemy in every period and long-term (main) enemy. In
every period, focusing on immediate enemy and ending reunion of immediate and long- term enemies.
Two periods of struggle against enemies to defend the revolutionary, independence and sovereignty of the country:
(1) The 1st period of Sept 2nd ,45- March 6th ,46:
In order to take advantage of contradictions among enemies, in this period the
revolutionaries performed: “ Negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek troops in the North,
beating French troops in the South”
+ The Vietnamese had to avoid to fight both enemies at the same time in imbalance
of power. Therefore revolutionaries had to affirm the most dangerous enemy. Of the
two imperialist forces, French troops was the most dangerous because it wanted to lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
reinvade Vietnam once again. Lu Han’s army had 200,000 troops, but it was not vis-
à-vis enemy in this period. We needed to focus on fighting with French troops in the
south, as a vis-à-vis and main enemy of Vietnamese revolution at that time.
+ In order to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek in the North and the government had
to make concessions as follows:
Supplying the food for Chiang Kai-shek troops; making some political
concessions to Chiang agents ( Nguyen Hai Than of the Viet Cach as vice president;
Nguyen Tuong Tam of the Viet Quoc as foreign minister and two other seats of
minister,…; 70 seats in the National Assembly ( before the elections)… The
tactics were very flexible and pragmatic on the basis of revolutionary principles (
leadership of the Party, the state in hands of the people in every level, sovereignty of the country),…
In the South, from September 23rd ,1945 the resistant war against French had
begun. President Ho Chi Minh made the proclamation of fighting and sacrificing their
lives to safeguard independence of the country. Armed with bamboo spears, the
southern people rose in revolt against French army backed up by British and
Japanese troops. In the early 1946, the French had occupied the main towns in the
Cochinchina and southern Central region..
(2) The 2nd period of March 6th - Dec 19th ,1946:
“ Negotiating with French troops in the North, sweeping away Chiang Kai-shek troops”.
- In the early 1946, French armies wanted to go to the North in preparing for allout
reinvading. Actively, Vietnamese sought a compromise with the French. This would
lead to the end of the Chiang force occupation in the North. The Vietnamese
revolutionaries would buy time in preparing for the resistant war against French
invaders in the whole country later.
Therefore, the Preliminary convention of March 6th, 1946 was signed by President
Ho Chi Minh and Jean Sainteny, representing the French government with the following main provisions: (1)
The French recognizes the DR Viet Nam as free state with its own
government, parliament, army and finances, and as part of Indochinese Federation and the French Commonwealth. (2)
The Vietnam declares itself ready to offer a friendly welcome to the French
army when it relieves the Chinese troops, in accordance with international agreements. (3)
Immediately after signing, each of the contracting parties shall take all
necessary measures to cease hostilities on the spot, maintain troops in their lOMoAR cPSD| 58097008
respective positions and create a favorable climate vital for the immediate opening
of frank and friendly negotiations.
With this agreement, the revolutionaries swept away Chiang army and had good
conditions for struggling against only an enemy.
In order to buy time, soon after the Preliminary agreement the government had to
prolong peaceful time in the North. Therefore, the complex struggle began over its
implementation, combining military, political, diplomatic measures.
15,000 French troops entered Ha Noi while Chiang Kai-shek 200,000 troops pulled out,
taking with them the Viet Quoc and Viet Cach adventurers. The struggle had a good
opportunity to concentrate against French troops.
The talk at Da Lat of April- May, 1946 failed down because of basic differences between the two sides.
The July-1946 Fontainebleau conference also failed down . In such situation, on
September 14th Ho Chi Minh tried to sign a modus vivendi with Marius Moutet for
prolonging peaceful time as soon as possible! The time for negotiation and peace was very
necessary for Vietnamese to prepare for the indispensable resistant war against French in whole country.
In November 1946, French troops opened fire on Vietnamese forces simultaneously in
Hai Phong and Lang Son. On December 17th , 1946 French troops attacked the Hang Bun
of Ha Noi killing a hundred people. On 19 December, the French command sent an
ultimatum to the Vietnamese government.
On the evening of December 19th , 1946, President Ho Chi Minh made an appeal to
the nation for starting the resistant war against French invaders in whole country: “ The
time has come to rise in revolt…. Our people will win”.